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Abstract: 
 
This thesis is focusing on the United Nations Quick Impact Projects, which were 
officially established as part of the UN peacekeeping missions program through the 
Brahimi report in 2004. Their primary purpose is to develop and strengthen the 
relationship between the mission and the host population. Precisely, this analysis is 
centering on the influence that improved relationships have on the effectiveness of a UN 
mission. In order to do so, the structure of this research is based on a comparative 
method, using interviews from the field and at the UN headquarters in New York City. 
The purpose of such method is to gather substantive data to enable the establishment of a 
first layer of evaluation. The study-cases are the United Nations Organization 
Stabilization Mission in DR Congo (MONUSCO), the United Nations Mission in Liberia 
(UNMIL) and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Other 
participants to the interviews are from the United Nations civil affairs Office and the 
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). 
Both the United Nations and the IR literature have lacked the analysis to evaluate the 
correlation between the improvement of population trust and the increase of the mission’s 
effectiveness. Therefore, this analysis demonstrates the reasons of the absence of such 
framework and proposes recommendations to develop a first layer of structural 
assessment.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“If we don’t act now and decisively, I will not exclude the possibility of a 
genocide occurring.”1 These are the words of Amada Dieng, United Nations Special 
Adviser on the prevention of genocide, to describe the appalling scenario that occurred in 
Central African Republic. Echoing this statement, France, the UN Security Council 
president during January 2014 explained: “given the seriousness of the situation in the 
Central African Republic, which may implode, the international community should lend 
its immediate support to the African force.”2 
One may think that this is the first time that the Central African Republic has 
encountered such a fate, however, since its independence in 1960, 13 mandates were 
developed from 1997 to 2013 to protect, secure and assist this country in its peace 
process. Although mandates have been designed, and joint work with the African Union 
(AU) and the UN have been established to protect this country from chaos, it seems that 
peace never lasted long.  
Peacekeeping operations have fundamentally been established by the United 
Nations to assist in the peace process between conflicting parties and assure the 
protection of civilians. However, since the terrible outcome of different UN missions in 
the ‘90s, the peacekeeping operation mandates were enlarged to include broader actions. 
As Diehl and Druckman say in their book Evaluating Peace Operations, “peace 
                                                        
1 Reuters, Friday November 1st 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/01/us-
centralafrica-un-idUSBRE9A00Y120131101 
2 Gérard Araud, December 2013, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-
policy-1/united-nations/french-presidency-of-the-un-7818/article/french-presidency-of-
the-un-18785 
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operations refer to the range of peace missions (traditional peacekeeping, robust 
peacekeeping, peace-building, peace observation).”3 
This analysis will focus on peace-building missions in countries that have 
undergone intrastate conflict. The main goal of this type of mission is to assist countries 
in rebuilding the institutional framework of their State to prevent them from falling back 
into war. As one can imagine, peace-building missions are long-standing, sinuous and 
complicated. The missions are asked to assist the State in restoring its authority through 
the reinforcement of its public institutions. Similarly to the traditional peacekeeping 
operations, peace-building missions cannot be set up without the full consent of the 
parties involved. Marrack Goulding, in his article The Evolution of United Nations 
Peacekeeping explains that the consent of the country can be a strength thanks to the 
legitimacy it implies for the country mission, however it could easily turn into a 
weakness if the government uses it as a reason not to follow the mission’s 
recommendations or as a threat for the mission to lose its authorized existence.4 
In 2000, Secretary-General Kofi Annan requested the establishment of a Panel in 
order to address the challenges of the new era and to adequately promote peace by 
improving the United Nations peace operation system. Lahkdar Brahimi, chairman of this 
committee on UN Peace Operations replied to Kofi Annan that this endeavor has been 
accomplished “to offer frank, specific and realistic recommendations for ways in which 
                                                        
3Diehl Paul, Druckman Daniel, Evaluating Peace Operations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers Inc, 2010), 1. 
 
4Goulding Marrack, The evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping, in International 
Affairs, Vol. 69, No 3 (July 1993), p. 454. 
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to enhance [the peace operation system] capacity.” 5 It also informs that the peace 
operations were firstly military and now involves a growing civilian capacity. The 
peacebuilding process is therefore aimed to “reassemble the foundations of peace and to 
provide the tools for building a safe, strong and sustainable state.”6 In this attempt to 
renovate the peacekeeping operation structure, Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) were first 
introduced in the Brahimi Report, which “recommended that a small percentage of a 
mission’s first-year budget should be made available to the representative or special 
representative of the Secretary-General leading the mission to fund QIPs in its area of 
operations, with the advice of the United Nations Country Team’s Resident 
Coordinator.”7They “are small-scale, rapidly-implementable projects, of benefit to the 
population.”8 
Diehl and Druckman explain that previous research on evaluation of peace 
operations “focus generally on the conditions for success rather than on the mechanisms 
responsible for the outcome.” 9  This analysis will therefore concentrate on the QIPs 
mechanisms and evaluate their impact on peace operation effectiveness.  
QIPs are supposed to develop a climate of trust between different actors involved 
in the peace process10: the host government, which has been tremendously weakened 
during times of conflict, the missions, which needs to legitimate its presence, the 
population, who have long been disillusioned and NGOs involved in the QIPs 
implementation. They are also aiming at “attracting future voluntary support” and “might 
                                                        
5 Letter from Lahkdar Brahimi to Secretary-General Kofi Annan on August 17, 2000 
6United Nations, Report of the Panel on UN peace operations, 2000, paragraph 13, p. 3 
7 United Nations Secretariat, Quick Impact Project, Policy Directive, 2013, 2 
8 Ibid., 3 
9 Diehl, Druckman, op. cit., 7 
10 United Nations Secretariat, Quick Impact Project, Polict Directive, 2013, p. 3 
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attract the attention of development and reconstruction donors.”11 Not only do the QIPs 
attempt to develop strong relationships between different actors during the 
implementation of the mandate requirements, they are also a springboard for future 
voluntary donations. As the Henri L. Stimson Center report also details, the Quick Impact 
Projects are applied to a variety of activities: education, sanitation, or the reconstruction 
of public infrastructure such as prison or courts.12They could also be aimed at developing 
structures to promote human rights, such as agricultural projects for prisoners reinsertion 
or the construction of different rooms separating detainees given their age or gender.  
While QIPs were officially created in 2004, no project evaluation of their impact 
on effectiveness has been undertaken. More importantly, most of the interviewees who 
participated in the discussion on QIPs explained that they had no idea how to assess the 
population needs or the QIPs impact on the mission mandates. The goal of this thesis will 
therefore be to call for the establishment of an assessment of the QIPs on the mission’s 
effectiveness. The analysis starting point is to consider that by developing strong 
relationships between different actors and stakeholders, QIPs assist the missions in 
developing a stable environment for the mandate’s achievement. From this argument, 
several questions are raised. What are the types of relationships discussed? How often 
should the mission be in contact with the population to properly understand its needs? Is 
there really an improvement in the population’s opinion with regards to the mission once 
the QIPs are closed?  
                                                        
11 The Henri L. Stimson Center, Brahimi Report and the future of UN Peace Operations 
(Washington DC: 2003), 56. 
12 Ibid., 57. 
8 
 
All these questions needs to be answered if the United Nations wishes to properly 
establish a framework of evaluation of their Quick Impact Project’s impact. This analysis 
will therefore attempt to construct a frame of inquiry in order to facilitate such 
assessment material.  
Although being a modest part of the UN missions’ budget, we can argue that QIPs 
impact, if correctly implemented, can strengthen the chances of success of UN operations 
by increasing the legitimacy of the United Nations mission and thus opening the dialogue 
between the host government and the UN personnel. It could even develop other links of 
partnerships which would further improved the mission’s effectiveness.  Besides, through 
the implementation of short-term projects such as QIPs, “the threat of withdrawal", 
mentioned in Goulding’s work, could be minimized by the increase in the mission’s 
short-term achievements.  It could also develop trust by the population towards the 
peacekeepers and facilitate their work, and lastly, on the long-term, they could create 
opportunities for further financial support.  
Consequently, this research study asks: how can we accurately measure Quick 
Impact Project’s impact on the UN missions’ effectiveness? 
The main hypothesis of this research is to prove that by strengthening good 
relations between the actors working for the stabilization of peace and promoting future 
economic support, QIPs genuinely improve the effectiveness of a peace operation. 
However as it has been previously stated, no proper set of measurement have been 
defined to prove such purpose. This project’s goals is understand the reasons of such 
absence and establish a set of recommendations to facilitate the establishment of a 
framework of evaluation. 
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In order to carry out this analysis, I will use practical sources such as reports from 
the United Nations, reports from NGOs and I will perform interviews with United 
Nations staff, both at the Headquarters and in the missions. With regards to the latter, an 
analysis of the Quick Impact Projects influence on the mission effectiveness raises 
different questions that could become the basis for interviews, as well as for the corpus of 
my research13. 
Apart from the interviews and the literature from the United Nations, I will also 
use sources that have been published on the evaluation of peace operations in order to 
substantiate my analysis based on a qualitative methodology. My research will not be a 
single-case project, I will use three different missions in order to enable generalization 
toward the implementation of this policy and its impact on peace operations success. Out 
of these three, two are located in Africa (Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire) and one is located 
outside the African continent, Haiti, which allows plurality in the type of cases and so 
better legitimacy for this research. The literature will allow me to find a standard 
framework to define the concept of success and failure of peace operations and to 
accurately relate it to the effectiveness of QIPs in these missions. 
With regards to the time period of the assessment, the QIPs are being 
implemented during the first year of the mission in theory, however, as the research goes 
on, it might be possible to observe an influence on a longer term. Besides, if QIPs are 
known to be fast implemented, almost immediate, it also generate financial support and 
develop a strong climate of trust, which can be assumed as impacts that go beyond the 
simple year of operation.  
                                                        
13 See full set of questions in the appendix of this research 
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Finally, the study will follow a typical framework of analysis; a literature review 
follows the introduction. Chapter 3 is the definition of terms used in the analysis, in order 
to provide better visibility and understanding for the following chapters. Chapter IV will 
consist in the presentation of the different study-cases, lastly the subsequent chapter is 
aggregating the data collected in chapter 4 in order the reasons that makes the 
establishment of the framework so problematic for the United Nations. 
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Chapter II: The literature Review 
 
 
Refocusing the research: From Peacekeeping to Peace-building 
Saira Mohamed sets her study on a structural level. Rather than wondering if a 
peacekeeping mission achieved its mandate or failed in its attempt, she wonders whether 
or not the peace-building process should stay under the authority of the Security Council. 
She believes that the Trusteeship Council should be reformed to handle this new kind of 
peace making. Indeed, as she explains, the peace operations diverged from traditional 
military peacekeeping to now focus primarily on state-collapsing situations. The 
interesting part of her research for this analysis lies in her attempt to separate 
peacekeeping from peace-building, as she explained, “following the Cold War, the UN 
embarked upon a new type of peace operation. The mandate of these missions extended 
beyond matters of war and security and required UN peacekeepers to undertake a range 
of civilian functions […].”14Mohamed details a recent evolution of peacekeeping where it 
is no longer kept into the field of security and military, but it has evolved into a civilian 
capacity where peace-making extends into state-building, even state-reinforcing. 
Although, her research emphasizes the legitimacy of the Security Council, it reveals a 
more precise topic than peacekeeping, the notion of peace-building, critical for our 
research. Indeed, the narrowed topic of peace-building is extremely relevant to the Quick 
Impact Projects analysis. These were established in the Brahimi report in order to address 
the shortcomings of the traditional peacekeeping missions. More accurately, although 
                                                        
14 Mohamed Saira, From Keeping Peace to Building Peace : A proposal for a revitalized 
United Nations Trusteeship Council, in Columbia Law Review, Vol. 105, No. 3 (Apr., 
2005) p. 809 
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unofficial, the UN personnel have already taken such actions in the past15, however, the 
development of the Brahimi Report made official this type of procedure, enabling the 
establishment of policies attached to the concept of building peace.  Indeed, by focusing 
on peacekeeping effectiveness, this analysis attempts to explore and assess the different 
processes in which third-party missions assist the state in redefining its authority after it 
has collapsed or has been consequently weakened. Furthermore, as defined during the 
High Level Panel Report in 2004, “the core task of peace building is to build effective 
public institutions that, through negotiations with civil society, can establish a consensual 
framework for governing within the Rule of Law”. 
Also, Hartzell, Hoddie and Rotchild talk about “stabilizing the peace” through the 
reinforcement of the sustainability of the State 16 . If the State has lost its internal 
sovereignty there is a high percentage of chance that peace will not last. A strong and 
democratic state, to be differentiated with an authoritarian regime, is necessary to gain 
the trust of the population and therefore achieve a stabilization of peace. Although this 
article seems to only focus on the military and security aspect of a peace operation17, two 
facts are important for this study: the necessary democratization of the State in post civil 
war conflict and the need for the government to gain the trust of the population in order 
to become strong and sustainable. Indeed, these two variables reveal that Quick Impact 
Projects by improving the well being of the population can benefit the mission and the 
host government in gaining a climate of trust and therefore improve the overall 
                                                        
15 Documentary Sierra Leone: Rebuilding a Torn Society  
16 Hartzell C., Hoddie M., Rotchild D., Stabilizing the Peace after Civil War: An 
investigation of some Key Variables, in International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 1 (winter 
2001) pp 183-208 
17 Ibid, pp192-193 
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effectiveness of the UN country team in assisting the State to stabilize the peace on the 
long run.  
Again concerning peace building, Samuels’s work18 enlightens the scholarly field 
by developing an empirical strategy based on the observations of shortcomings and 
achievements that has been done in former peace operation such as Timor Leste or Haiti. 
She focuses on three pillars: “political transformation, reform of the governance 
framework, and the associated building constitutions through capacity transfer.”19 Diehl 
and Druckman refers to former scholarly works to differentiate the “new peacekeeping” 
concept taken from Ratner, or also characterized as “second-generation missions” by 
Mackinlay and Chopra from the traditional peacekeeping which they characterizes by 
their “core peacekeeping goals” 20 : “violence abatement”, “conflict containment” and 
“conflict settlement”. What is important to bear in mind is that traditional peacekeeping 
has not been replaced by the new form of peace operations, it has rather evolved into a 
more complex structure and encompasses much more than the three goals previously 
mentioned and therefore necessitates a new form of evaluation of effectiveness.  
Lastly, the article There are peace-building tasks for everybody from Chaldwick 
Alger is interesting because it attempts to discuss the “culture of peace” promoted by the 
United Nations and the development of a multi-actor networks in peace-building 
processes. In the case of Quick Impact Projects, the policy and the finance are led by the 
United Nations, however it involves a plurality of actors which are described in Alger’s 
                                                        
18 Samuels K., Sustainability and Peacebuilding: A key Challenge, in Development in 
Practice, Vol. 15, No. 6 (Nov., 2005) pp 728-736 
19ibid, p. 729 
20Diehl Paul, Druckman Daniel, Evaluating Peace Operations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers Inc., 2010) p. 29-31 
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article: Non-governmental organizations, International organization, businesses, the 
population and of course the host government. This article underlines the modernity of 
policies such as QIPs which attempts to involve a plurality of actors in order to reach a 
high level of effectiveness.  
 
The need for a systematic analysis 
The effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions is not a recent subject of analysis. Since 
the end of the cold war, many academic researchers attempted to define the effectiveness 
of such endeavors along with the UN itself which has produced many reports to assess its 
achievements and shortcomings.  
Mullenbach attempts to redirect the topic because “peacekeeping missions have 
not been adequately examined.”21 He details the scope of these inadequate examinations 
by describing the errors in their level of analysis. Many studies focused on the success or 
failure of certain peacekeeping missions without achieving a proper level of 
generalization. The limitation of these analysis reveals a larger issue when one examines 
peacekeeping mission’s effectiveness; each conflict is different and therefore each 
mission should be different. Therefore, focusing on the missions as the principle subject 
of research could lead to a consequent error in the analysis. Attempting to explain the 
failure or success of one mission will not necessarily be a tool for understanding those to 
come. This is precisely the mis en garde enunciated by Mullenbach that this research 
should follow. On the same topic, Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman attempt to define a 
general framework of analysis in order to facilitate accurate assessment of the 
                                                        
21 Mullenbach Mark J., Deciding to Keep Peace: An analysis of International Influences 
on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions, in International Studies 
Quaterly, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Sep., 2005) p. 530 
15 
 
effectiveness of the United Nations peace operations while enabling a high level of 
generalization. In order to do so, they established a “Decision-making Template 
Approach”22 with five different steps. They explained that given the need to consider the 
goals of the peace operations in order to achieve an adequate analysis, the identification 
of primary goals23 becomes the basis of any research. In the case of this study, defining 
the goals of Quick Impact Projects in a general scheme and then in a mission-specific 
method becomes the foundation to properly assess their impact on the overall 
effectiveness of their mission, and more broadly on their general influence regarding 
peace operations.  
On a practical basis, the United Nations provides annual report on the 
achievement of particular missions. These documents assist the Security Council, which 
is the principal body making the decision to launch, extend or close a UN peacekeeping 
mission, in deciding whether or not a mandate should be extended, transformed or simply 
closed. For this research purpose, it will provide data, and practical information in order 
to enable the general evaluation. 
In 2000, the Security Council, decided to produce a report, No exit without 
strategy, in order to define the factors in which such actions are made.  With regards to 
this report, the President of the Security Council asked the Secretary-General of that time, 
Kofi Annan, to produce a report on the factors that determine the success or failure of 
peacekeeping missions. Annan explains the importance of uniqueness of each missions 
and insists on “[…] both the restoration of mutual confidence and the rehabilitation that 
                                                        
22 Diehl Paul, Druckman Daniel, Evaluating Peace Operations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers Inc., 2010) p. 26 
23 ibid, p. 25 
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help make an agreed border and a negotiated peace work.”24 Lastly, he refers to the 
importance of coordination with other international actors or UN agencies. Quick Impact 
Projects (QIPs) seem to match these expectations. QIPs policy and directive stipulate that 
their purpose is to “[…] establish and build confidence in the mission, its mandate, and 
the peace process, thereby improving the environment for effective mandate 
implementation.”25 Analyzing both academic and UN reports will enable this research to 
balance between theoretical expectations of generalization and the practical necessity of 
using case-by-case insight. This study will not necessarily focus on each mission but 
rather observed the policies that United Nations have attempted to synchronize as a 
general process of peacekeeping. In this case the Quick Impact Projects become a study 
in the broader picture of the UN peacekeeping missions. The goal is to understand if the 
UN Headquarters, where the policies are elaborated, properly assesses the requirements 
for long-standing peace when there are such a high variety of subjects.  
How my research adds to the field 
Few or no research studies have been constructed to establish a framework of 
evaluation for Quick Impact Projects. The bureaucratic system in which the United 
Nations staff members have to work often makes it difficult for them to define concrete 
steps, and understandings, to form proper criteria for assessment. The analysis undertaken 
by this thesis research of different UN missions and their QIPs teams’ work underlines 
the constraints the UN faces in establishing such a framework of evaluation. My research 
discloses the work of the UN staff and the UN system used to propose, choose and 
                                                        
24 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council: No Exit 
Without Strategy: Security Council decision-making and the closure or transition of 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, April 20th 2001, p. 2 
25United Nations, DPKO/DFS policy directive (revised), 2013 
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implement QIPs. Most importantly, this project attempts to understand the reality of QIPs 
and their goals when applied to the field. In the conclusion I offer recommendations on 
the practice of QIPs, field evaluation by local residents, and the necessity to enlarge the 
network of partnerships.  
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Chapter III: Methodology Employed for the evaluation of 
Quick Impact Projects on Peacekeeping Operations: 
 
This thesis is paved with a few challenges. This chapter uses different 
methodological processes in order to avoid bias and therefore maximize the accuracy of 
this research. 
Challenge 1: Finding a good balance between generalization and particularity 
This analysis is focusing on Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), a policy elaborated by 
the United Nations in order to maximize the effectiveness of its peacekeeping missions.  
The policy directive stipulates that the QIPs should be funded and operated in the “area 
of operation of the mission.”26 The semantic used in this directive is fundamental for the 
correctness of this research. If the policy discusses the “area of operation”, it is logical to 
assume that each mission have different areas of operation. Therefore, the first challenge 
to this analysis is to enable generalization in the study of an issue that seems to be 
functioning on a case-by-case basis. In order to do so, I am using previous academic 
work that has attempted to raise a level of generalization in the evaluation of 
peacekeeping missions. The core of this thesis is based on the evaluation framework 
defined by Diehl and Druckman in their book Evaluating Peace Operations. I will 
attempt to determine a general framework of “area of operations” in the rule of law 
missions and observe if whether or not the QIPs have been able to achieve their goals and 
consequently provided help in maximizing the country mission’s effectiveness. The 
academic sources will thus assist this research in reaching a level of generalization while 
respecting the singularity of each case.  
                                                        
26United Nations Secretariat, Quick Impact Project, Policy Directive, 2013, 2 
19 
 
The United Nations documents such as bi-annual or annual reports, policy 
directives, and lesson-learned will help in determining the theoretical expectations of 
QIPs and the reality of practice. Put together the scholarly works and the UN documents 
will provide this research with a balance between generalization and singularity. 
Challenge 2: Gathering information from people in the field 
In order to be as impartial as possible to conduct this study, I decided to gather 
information and personal opinions from interviews. The interview participants were 
selected both at the Headquarters (Civilian Affair department) and on the ground 
(Country teams in Haiti, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo and in the recently 
deployed mission in Mali). The goal of such interviews is to distinguish the theory taken 
from the UN documents and the scholarly work and the reality of the field. Two types of 
interviews were directed: face-to-face and via email. It was difficult for a Master thesis to 
travel and meet the UN personnel on the ground, this is the reason why part of the 
interviews had to be done through Internet rather than in person. 
The main issue when it came to gather the information from people on the ground 
is that the questions were often fastly answered and  
Unfortunately one of the shortcomings of this thesis is to have been unable to 
gather information from the population in the country, the Non-governmental 
organizations working in the field and from the government hosting the mission. A more 
advanced study, on a longer time frame would enable me to travel and meet with the 
people on the field in order to maximize visibility and impartiality. The QIPs imply a 
plurality of actors and I acknowledge the limitations of this collection of information. 
Lastly, the other issue raised by the missing interviews from other stakeholders does not 
20 
 
represent the fact that “ these actors often have different goals or different priorities or 
assign different priorities to shared goals”27 as Diehl and Druckman emphasize in their 
book. 
Challenge 3: Maximizing neutrality, avoiding bias 
Jeremy Farral explains that the problem of drawning upon data from United 
Nations reports is that these documents often lack neutrality 28 . Not that the United 
Nations is purposely biased but it is important to bear in mind that in order to keep the 
financial support from the member states, agencies and offices of the UN often have to 
emphasize their achievements rather than their shortcomings. As I was interning for one 
of the component of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, I realized that 
the member states' expectations were often higher than the possibility of actions from the 
UN personnel. Therefore, in order to avoid subvention cuts, these services had to present 
a positive front and focus on their successes. Once again, this is not done on purpose but 
rather it is a systemic problem inside the United Nations structure that should be assessed 
while doing research on a UN endeavor. In order to do so, I decided to gather information 
from the scholarly field and from the UN, the former would bring some neutrality to the 
latter. I also decided to get information from Non-governmental Organization reports, 
hoping that it would highlights information that would not necessarily appear in the 
international organization documents.  
                                                        
27Diehl Paul, Druckman Daniel, Evaluating Peace Operations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers Inc., 2010) p. 12 
28 Farral Jeremy, Recurring Dilemmas in a Recurring Conflict: Evaluating the UN 
Mission in Liberia (2003-2006), in International Peacekeeping, Vol. 16, No 3-4 (2012) p. 
311 
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I want to insist on the fact that for six months I observed the work done at the 
Secretariat and I was amazed by the passion and the hard-working mentality of the staff. 
Their anxiety regarding financial support is a down side of this system and should not be 
interpreted as a lack of competence, quite the contrary. Again, in order to adequately 
assess UN works on the ground and at the Headquarters, one should be aware of that 
financial pressure that hangs on every service of this institution. Moreover, one should 
acknowledge the disparity between the high expectations and the lack of capacities 
(financial, staff…) attached to a mission. For instance, in the case of rule of law area of 
operation, the United Nations member states often expect rapid changes when the reality 
is often long and sinuous. The QIPs have been introduced to address these problems and 
provide fast improvement to a long-process mission. Studying the capacity for QIPs to 
achieve such goals is also a way for this research to determine whether the United 
Nations have been able to address this long-standing issue.  
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Chapter IV: Defining Terms 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with a definition of 
effectiveness but also to give a clear explanation on the whys and wherefores of United 
Nations Quick Impact Project. Effectiveness of peacekeeping missions is a complicated 
matter since it implies a range of area of operations and stakeholders. If peace agreements 
are respected and disarmament has been agreed upon, the rule of law area might be 
running behind in their objectives. Therefore, in order to properly determine the concept 
of effectiveness, it is essential to first define the assessed activities.  
This research centers its observations on the rule of law area of operations. More 
precisely, it focuses on the re-establishment or creation of Justice and Correctional 
institutions in post-conflict situations in Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Haiti. The impact of the Quick Impact Projects with regards to these two components of 
the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions will be the dependent variables, while 
the effectiveness of the peace operation being impacted by these projects will define the 
independent variable of this study.  
The Quick Impact Projects 
On March 7 2000, Secretary-General Kofi Annan required a high-level panel on 
the future of Peacekeeping Operations whose aim has been to adequately assess the 
shortcomings of the UN missions. The formal introduction of the Quick Impact Project 
was included in the report of this reformation process. Different criteria could describe 
the Quick Impact Project, and since its first introduction as a UN policy it has 
encountered some evolution in order to match the reality of the field.  
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In 2007, a Quick Impact Project policy directive has been devised to define the 
nature, scope, value and duration of the projects. In the policy, QIPs are “small-scale, 
rapidly-implementable projects, of benefit to the population.”29 They are used by the 
peacekeepers in order to create a climate of trust and confidence about the mission, its 
mandate and the overall peace process. Therefore, they are supposed to “improve the 
environment for effective mandate implementation”30 
The Quick Impact Projects have three general criteria of impact: First, it is 
supposed to promote acceptance of the mandated tasks. Secondly, it should be building 
confidence in the peace process and building support through the demonstration of early 
achievements. Thirdly, it might generate support for the mission.31 In theory, if QIPs are 
properly implemented, these steps should be appearing in the establishment of quickly 
implemented initiatives, and the mission should be able to develop longer-term projects 
without risking losing the confidence of the host population and therefore avoiding to 
notice the development of a negative climate. As sum up below, the QIPs should 
encompass the characteristics as presented in the 2013 revised policy32:  
. 10.1  small-scale and low-cost;  
. 10.2  designed to be of benefit to the population;  
. 10.3  planned and implemented within a short-time frame;  
. 10.4  of a non-recurrent nature, and do not place an unforeseen financial burden 
on the recipient or create material requirements that cannot be met within 
the country;  
                                                        
29 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, QUICK IMPACT 
PROJECTS Policy Directive, 12 February 2007, p 2. 
30 ibid 
31 ibid, p2-3 
32 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, 
QUICK IMPACT PROJECTS Revised Policy, January 2013. 
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. 10.5  usually visible to the population;  
. 10.6  done in consultation with representatives of national or local authorities, 
and, where appropriate, with the participation of local communities;  
. 10.7  done in consultation with relevant UN actors, and not duplicative of the 
programmes of UNCT or other actors;  
. 10.8  selected in an impartial and transparent manner;  
. 10.9  sensitive to considerations of gender, ethnicity, age and vulnerability;  
. 10.10  selected and implemented in accordance with the principles of ‘Do No 
Harm’  
. 10.11  sensitive to any potential risks to the population, including risk of 
conflict or risk of damage to the environment  
The analysis and evaluation of the three study-cases will enable this research to 
observe the good implementation of these characteristics and thus conclude if when 
properly implemented Quick Impact Projects can have a positive impact on the overall 
mission effectiveness. 
The Quick Impact Projects are initially implemented during the mission’s first 
year, however, in some cases such as with regards to the mission in Sierra Leone, the 
General Assembly recommended that the QIPs budget should be extended to the second 
year of the mission. In the 2011 QIPs Lessons learned study, it is recommended that the 
duration of implementation should be extended to the second year of the mission in order 
to avoid delays. Also, for each project a timeframe of three months is mentioned in the 
policy but not in a compulsory manner. The lessons learned document therefore 
recommended the extension to a six-month timeframe for each project to be 
implemented. As the document stipulates, “increase implementation timeframe in the 
Policy Directive to a recommended maximum of six months, to allow a more realistic 
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period for project implementation, whilst retaining the defining characteristic of QIPS as 
projects that are ‘rapidly implementable.’ 
With regards to the financial characteristics, QIPs must represent a very small 
amount of the entire mission’s budget. As an illustration, in the 2013-2014 peacekeeping 
mission budget, QIPs represented 0.87% of the MINUSTAH whole budget and 0.21% of 
the UNMIL budget.33 
The Quick Impact Projects are broadly defined to have a positive impact on the 
wellbeing of the population. In the case of the rule of law area of operations, QIPs are 
funded to develop capacity-building. Indeed in the lessons learned study, QIPs should be 
differentiated from humanitarian action to avoid “be[ing] viewed as an unwelcome and 
ill- considered incursion into humanitarian space by military or by mission actors.”34 
Therefore, to avoid any confusion with other UN structure work, QIPs are implemented 
on three major pillars with regards to Rule of Law sector: Human Rights and 
Livelihoods, Security, and institutional capacity and infrastructure. One can imagine that 
these three sectors of action are profoundly intertwined, and a deeper analysis of QIPs in 
each study-case will be provided in the following chapter.  
Defining Effectiveness  
Evaluating the effectiveness of a mission has always been tedious. Scholars 
have often concentrated their work towards the notion of “success” or “failure” and the 
factors influencing such outcomes. Mullenbach has an interesting point of view since he 
                                                        
33 United Nations General Assembly, Approved resources for peacekeeping operations 
for the period from 1 july 2013 to 30 June 2014, distributed on 18 July 2013. 
34 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Lessons Learned Study: 
Management Quick Impact Project, January 2011, p 9. 
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starts his discussion by stipulating: “In fact, the success or failure of a third-party 
peacekeeping mission may at least partly be influenced by the initial decision to establish 
or not establish the mission.” 35  Indeed, the first angle to define effectiveness is to 
understand why the mission came to existence. If one acknowledges the goal of the 
mission, it becomes easier to assess its achievements. 
Secondly, Diehl and Druckman explain, “it is rare that any peace operation is 
uniformly a success or a failure. For an assessment to be accurate, it is essential to 
observe and evaluate the different dimensions of the mission and base the analysis on the 
achievements of their respective goals. For example, UN mandates might set up a list of 
objectives; however, the different stakeholders on the ground might have different 
priorities or expectations from the mission.  
In this case, the observation of Quick Impact Projects will attempt to analyze if 
the work of the UN staff has been facilitated through the improvement of their relations 
with the population, the government and the NGOs. That is to say, the purpose of this 
research is to determine if the amelioration of relations on one hand and the prospect of 
future financial support on the other hand consequently benefited the UN staff in doing a 
better work and achieving what the mandate has stipulated with regards to rule of law 
issues. Again, the basis for this analysis is to understand if the Quick Impact Projects 
have a positive impact on the UN mission’s work, which in the long term would enable 
them to stabilize and strengthen the rule of law institutions in the host countries.  
                                                        
35Mullenbach Mark J., Deciding to Keep Peace: An analysis of International Influences 
on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions, in International Studies 
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Chapter V: The United Nations Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo – 
MONUSCO 
MONUSCO Background: 
 
MONUSCO was not the first UN operation engaged in Congo. Two preceded the latest 
one, starting in July 1960 with the ONUC, after the outbreak of a civil war following the 
independence of the former colony.  
The purpose of this first international intervention was to assist the newly created 
Congolese government in strengthening its public authority through the reinforcement of 
rule of law institutions. Its primary function was then extended to “maintaining the 
territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, preventing the occurrence of 
civil war and securing the removal of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory 
personnel not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries”36 In his book 
entitled The theory and practice of peacekeeping, Indar Jit Rikhye underlies the collapse 
of the entire state structure that required the involvement of UN technical assistance and 
its direct military action to assist this sovereign power in restoring law and order 
throughout its territory. He further explained that the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
which was administered by the Belgians during the colonial era, did not have an educated 
leadership that could have been able to stabilize the public infrastructure in their newly 
independent country. “But the Belgians had not created any indigenous leadership, as the 
British had done in their colonies; nor had they established a cadre of évolués (highly 
                                                        
36http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onuc.htm 
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educated Africans), as the French had done. Within a few days of Independence the 
whole administrative infrastructure had disappeared amid chaos and bloodshed.”37 
Although rapidly established in the country, the ONUC was confronted to several 
political issues that tremendously hampered the mission’s capacity to work. 
Hammarskjöld was challenged by the September constitutional crisis that occurred when 
Patrice Lumumba, the Prime Minister, annoyed by the UN’s refusal to deal with the 
Katanga insurrection by force, decided to undertake such mission’s by himself. The 
intervention was highly contested by the President Kasavubu, who used the principle of 
Loi Fondamentale to destitute the Prime Minister from his function and replaced him by 
the Senate President, Jospeh Ileo. The political crisis reached another cataclysmic level 
when Colonel Mobutu, the army Chief of Staff, lead a coup which evicted Kasavubu, 
Lumumba and Ileo’s from the political scene.  
As Rikhye concludes, ONUC was a new form of peacekeeping, working in the 
middle of a civil war. After the dismantlement of its territory into 4 political spheres only 
ONUC has been able to reunify this sovereign power into one single political unit. 
Peacekeeping was therefore not only based on keeping peace through military separation 
of forces, although ONUC was also mandated to do so, it worked into political chaos in 
order to stabilize peace, which was threatened by political and ideological warfare.  
The second and third UN operations in Congo go hand in hand. The United 
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo was established in 
30 November 1999 through the resolution 1279 following the implementation of the 
Lusaka ceasefire agreement. This operation was strictly based on security and 
                                                        
37 Rikhye Indar Jit, The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping, London: C. Hurst and Co 
Publishers, 1984, p82 
29 
 
humanitarian issues and did not include any mandated task with regards to State building. 
Its main purposes were to observe the correct implementation of the ceasefire, monitor 
the disengagement of violence while providing assistance to the displaced persons, 
refugees and children and support the protection of human rights and the right of 
children38. After reaching a new phase of peace building, MONUC became the United 
Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(MONUSCO) through the Resolution 1925 on May, 28 2010, in order to assist the state 
intensively in developing a stable and strong public authority throughout the country and 
to emphasize the importance of rule of law institutions yet recognizing the importance of 
security with regards to civilians and the necessary cessation of all armed conflicts 
especially in the Kivus and Orientale Province. This new mandate enlarged consequently 
the work of the UN personnel to civilian affairs in assisting the state to develop a stable 
and peaceful environment. Martin Kobler, the Special Representative to the Secretary-
General reported to the Security Council in August 2014 during the Great Britain’s 
presidency. He firstly discussed the different issues that MONUSCO and the DRC 
government had to deal with since their last report: the M23 crisis, followed by the Allied 
Democratic Forces (ADF) crises which caused 66,000 Congolese to flee their homes and 
finally the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) attacks in Eastern 
DRC. He then explained that as of today, through the joint work with the Forces Armées 
de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) the M23 rebel groups has been 
dismantle, the FDLR strongly weakened and the ADF and FDLR had voluntarily agreed 
                                                        
38  United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1279: S/RES/1279, 30 November 1999. 
http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/368/17/PDF/N9936817.pdf?OpenElement 
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to a disarmament process. 4000 rebels from various groups have surrendered, 500,000 
Internally Displaced Persons have returned to their homes and thanks to the Nairobi 
declaration the process of rehabilitation is underway. However, as Martin Kobler 
expressed it, the situation is still fragile and the Mutarule massacre where 33 people died 
with the inaction of a MONUSCO contingent a few kilometers created a consequent gap 
in the confidence that the mission has been trying to build with the Congolese population. 
SRSG Martin Kobler personally took responsibility for the inaction; the commander has 
been relieved from his leading responsibility and an internal investigation is in process in 
order to raise accountability for nonintervention. Lastly, Martin Kobler recommended for 
a “paradigm shift” in the MONUSCO work through three core actions: “reaction to 
prevention”, “static to mobile”, “and protection by presence to protection by action”39.  
Martin Kobler also discussed the necessary increase in military engagement, being the 
priority in Eastern Congo in order to put a final stop to the FDLR’s action. More stability 
is thus perceived as the development of multiple opportunities for the well-being of the 
Congolese population, such as market’s development, farm works, education… This 
prospect of an effective society can only be envisaged if rebel groups are forced to 
disarm. The Security Sector Reform is still considerably slow but joint works with the 
government are underway. Finally, with regards to the role in assisting the government 
with Human Rights and democratic practices establishment, MONUSCO has been 
monitoring the opposition’s ability to freely express their opinions. The mission also 
works cooperatively with the government to ensure that all political decisions are 
constitutionally correct and therefore prevent undemocratic practices to occur.  The 
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general idea in the political stabilization facilitated by MONUSCO is based on the 
reconciliation of political differences through the development of an inclusive and 
comprehensive dialogue, which would establish free, fair elections and therefore enhance 
further stability in the whole territory.  
As a conclusion, we can understand that MONUSCO is different from the two 
precedent mission as it requires the UN personnel to undertake processes in order to 
stabilize the country not only on a security matter but also as a process of 
democratization, and social reintegration of the former armed forces. Therefore, it is 
interesting to evaluate the role played by QIPs in such endeavor. The following part of 
this chapter will list and gives detailed information on the different QIPs action that have 
been established and their impact on the overall mandated tasks of MONUSCO. 
MONUSCO Quick Impact Project Initiatives: 
 
In March 2015, the Secretary General’s report on MONUSCO came out. As a 
consequence, the new resolution 2211 published by the Security Council dedicated a 
chapter on “Gender issues, child protection, and interaction with civilian population.” 
This part encourages MONUSCO to further strengthen their interaction with civilians in 
order “to raise awareness and understanding about its mandate and activities.”40 The 
Security Council therefore recognizes the ultimate importance of bonding with the 
population in order to facilitate the work for MONUSCO. The resolution also focuses on 
the importance of creating strong public relations; In other words, it states that trust is a 
highly effective way to obtain reliable information on human rights violation or abuses 
                                                        
40 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2211, March 26th 2015, paragraph 12, p 
7. 
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and to identify potential threats.41 The role of QIPs is therefore significant for this new 
mandated year, as its main purpose is to assist the mission in developing strong relations 
with the populations through the achievement of small, fast-paced projects.  
The resolution also demands MONUSCO to operate serious structural reforms in 
order to make the mission more adequate to respond to its new challenges. In this 
changing dynamic, it became highly difficult to obtain data from the QIPs team, as their 
working group has been experiencing important changes since the end of 2014. Although 
they kindly accepted to participate, the responsibility of answering the questionnaire was 
being passed around to different UN personnel and a long time passed before the 
questionnaire came back. V 42  was the staff member who kindly participated to be 
interviewed, however she specified that her recent arrival at MONUSCO QIPs unit would 
make it difficult for her to answer core questions on MONUSCO’s experience on QIPs 
implementation.  V. has worked since 2005 in the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations. She spent five years in Haiti as a civil affairs officer and was moved to 
MONUSCO. She both worked at the mission’s headquarters and the regional offices 
(Kindu and Bukavu). Since September 2014, she has been re-assigned to MONUSCO 
HQ in Goma as a QIPs program manager in the QIPs Unit, under the authority of the 
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) for rule of law.  
In order to present MONUSCO’s QIPs initiatives, this chapter will be subdivided 
into four parts: the first part will focus on the objectives of QIPs in the recently reformed 
MONUSCO’s perspective. Second, the categories and actors will be presented, which 
will be followed by the implementation cycle based on MONUSCO’s Standard Operating 
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42 The name of that staff member will not be disclosed.  
33 
 
Procedure (SOPs) and the last part of this analysis will center on the critical aspect of 
MONUSCO’s use and purpose of QIPs initiative.  
 
MONUSCO QIPs Major Objectives 
In the first part of her responses, V. focused on the objectives defined by the QIPs 
unit for the year 2014/201543. The first part concerns the planning and implementation 
plan of the approved QIPs for the financial year of 2014/2015, which has allocated 
$7,000,000. Within the allocation of this year budget, 75% of the $7,000,000 has to be 
focusing on a new concept of “Islands of Stabilities”44 and to support the restoration of 
state authorities. The concept of Island of Stabilities will be further detailed in the last 
part of this chapter. As in many other UN missions, their purpose is not only to maintain 
peace, but first and foremost, to strengthen the public authority in order to assure long-
lasting stability. Therefore, developing strong and effective public institutions becomes a 
UN priority, which by extent, falls into the QIPs mandate. In the case of MONUSCO rule 
of law, it means working closely with public officers in order to assist them in 
refurbishing public institutions, building strong relations with representatives of the 
public force (police, justice…) and assure that the population feels confident in their 
political and security representatives.  
The second part of the major objectives relates to the revision and monitoring of 
the effectiveness of implementation of QIPs Standard of Procedures. In order to 
efficiently proceed in the achievements of projects, QIPs unit has to follow a strict 
procedure that is summed up in their Standard Operating Procedure, based on the policy 
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and guidelines published by the UN headquarters. The new MONUSCO SOPs, according 
to V., has been implemented with delay due to the redeployment of staff and the general 
structural reforms that MONUSCO undertook in the end of 2014. The SOPs are the main 
tool used by the QIPs team to select, implement and monitor projects. 
The third part concerns the closure of the projects for the financial year 
2013/2014. During the past years the Board of Auditors and the OIOS/audits have 
produced reports of the achievements and their recommendations for QIPs. One of the 
goals for this coming financial year is to implement the different directions given by 
these two monitoring entities. Lastly although staying in the same dynamic, the QIPs 
team is also expected to produce report for this financial year.  
These different goals are set up in order to organize QIPs unit’s work for one 
year. They might evolve given the reality of the field but this is what is expected of them 
for the 2014/2015 financial year.   
The other general tasks are about “managing QIPs.” In this regards, V. explains 
that the “QIP unit at MONUSCO is responsible to support 9 Head of Regional Offices 
and the QIPs focal points to identify and implement QIPs in the sectors.”45 
Stakeholders and categories of QIPs 
Curiously, when V. answered the question on the stakeholders, she only 
mentioned the UN services and agencies. She made no comment on the population, the 
government and NGOs contrary to the other mission who gave more importance to the 
non-UN organs. The fact that she works at the HQ and not at the regional office might 
explain her brief answer. Indeed, her unit might be more involved at the upper level of 
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the QIPs structure, that is to say, they are in touch with UN services and agencies to 
assure that the QIPs initiated are not overlapping with other UN initiatives, but they do 
not necessarily interact with the other stakeholders that are usually working at the other 
side of the QIPs structure. This unit is also directly in contact with the different focal 
points at the regional offices, who are dealing with the QIPs implementation. Indeed, she 
explained in one of her answers that: “QIPs unit is only very seldom in contact with the 
population as the QIPs identification and implementation is managed in the sectors and 
QIPs team hardly have the capacity to visit the beneficiary. First time I will go in the 
field since September is to follow up implementation next week.”46 
The way in which V. answered the question on stakeholders also reflects that she 
might have interpreted stakeholders as UN’s partners more than concrete actors coming 
from different sectors (public, private, governmental, non-governmental, civil society…). 
In her answer, she says: “once the QIPs unit receives QIPs proposal from the sectors, the 
QIPs unit check with UN agencies for duplication and also for advice”47. She doesn’t say 
much about who are the actors who have submitted proposals, certainly because it is not a 
priority for her team to know where it comes from, this being the responsibility of the 
“sector” or region. Her team’s priority is to make sure that the proposals are realistically 
feasible according to the QIPs criteria or do not duplicate an already existing project. She 
also mentions the importance of checking with “the area of responsibilities.”48 These 
scopes of responsibility will enable them to get in touch with the agencies in charge of a 
domain in which a QIPs proposal falls. Thanks to these divisions of task, they are able to 
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47 Ibid, p3 
48 Interview with V on MONUSCO QIPs, March 2015, p3. 
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ask for advice from experienced actors that first will inform them if their projects is not 
already undertaken. Secondly, if there is no overlapping, they will be able to participate 
and bring knowledge to the construction of the project, therefore facilitating the process 
of implementation.  
The different agencies listed by V. are International Organization for Migration, 
UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDP and the Stabilization Unit (SSU). In her listing of QIPs 
categories she does not say much about Migration and Refugee assistance, however, in 
her listing of partners she both mentions the OIF and UNHCR that shows that assistance 
to displaced population is an important focus in MONUSCO QIPs.  
She also states the importance of collaboration and support in the QIPs. Here 
again, the circulation of information between the different agencies not only avoids loss 
of time and overlapping but it enables the different actors to support each other’s work in 
order to become as effective as possible.  
The implementation cycle49 
The first part of the Standard Operating Procedure states that “these SOP are in 
line with the DPKO/DFS Policy on Quick Impact Projects approved on 21 January 2013 
and mandatory for all staff engaged in the identification, selection, approval, 
implementation, monitoring, closure and evaluation of QIPs.”50 Therefore the SOP is the 
principal tool with which the QIPs unit and the focal points in charge of implementation 
and monitoring will have to follow in order to adequately undertake the projects. This 
                                                        
49 This part will mostly be based on the analysis of the Standard Operating Procedures 
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50 United Nation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Standard 
Operating Procedures for the Management of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) (revises 
draft), 2015, p2 
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document starts with a reminder taken from the policy on the nature and scope of the 
QIPs which states the value and duration, the purpose etc… Then, it focuses on the 
“selection and design of the QIP proposals,” in which it explains that the senior officer of 
each component (police, civilian or military) will assign a “project officer” who will 
become the focal point regarding any issue on project design, implementation and 
monitoring of progress.51 This part never refers to the criteria for the project officer to be 
selected. This falls into the quality of judgment and experience of the senior officer to 
select the best-fitted staff for the position. For instance, V. has been contacted by the 
Chief of civil affairs in GOMA who offered her to become Manager of the QIPs unit, 
which is consisted of 4 national staff (2 National-provided officers, two assistants) and 
herself (international staff). Once the responsible staff and focal point are selected, they 
are expected to present a proposal summary to the Head of Office who will check with 
the Mission priorities and the provincial work plan. The UN staff in the country team is 
“encouraged” by the UN HQ through the SOP to “seek out implementing partners to 
advance Mission mandate priorities.”52 The list of implementing partners include: UN 
agencies, other international organizations, national and international NGOs, local 
organizations, local authorities and government and state institutions. The document also 
specify that commercial contractors cannot be considered as a potential implementing 
partner53.   
The following section focuses on the legality of the implementing partners that 
needs to be registered and recommended by the local authorities or the local chiefs. 
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Consequently, the mission is expected to create a list of reliable and potential 
implementing partners.  
The next step is on the creation of the Quality Assurance Management Team 
(QAM), which entity will review and advise on QIPs. The Head of Office is in charge to 
establish such team and will designate a focal point whose task will be to organize QAM 
team meetings. According to the SOP, the QAM team shall include: senior components 
representatives, the Field Administrative Officer and Field Financial Officer, 
representatives from the Stabilization Support Unit, Gender or HIV/AIDS Unit. In the 
same chapter, the QAM team responsibilities are listed going from making sure that the 
proposals fits the QIPs criteria as enounced in the policy, assuring the usefulness of the 
project to the population it targets, establish logistical estimation for the construction of 
the projects, provides a detailed budget, to manage the land ownership of the QIPs site to 
assure access to the project officer, and making sure that the time frame is feasible as 
stated in the QIPs policy. 
The following part centers on the establishment of the Project Review Committee 
(PRC) in which the DSRSG will chair. The DSRSG designates the Chief of Office as the 
chairperson of the PRC. The PRC will be composed of the following members: DSRSG, 
Director of Mission Support, Force Commander, Chief of Staff, Police Commissioner, 
Chairs of Stabilization and Protection Tasks Force and Gender or HIV/ Aids Section 
representative. The Chief of Office is expected to supervise the QIPs unit and the latter 
will serve as the secretariat of the PRC. The responsibility of the PRC range from 
selecting and approving project based on the budget available for QIPs, endorsing the 
allotments and guidance provided to the field offices, reviewing the project proposals and 
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reviewing the annual QIPs evaluation. In summary, it is in charge of doing what does not 
fall under the QAM team responsibilities. Sub-paragraphs state that the PRC’s decisions 
are made by majority vote and every deliberation should be recorded and prepared by the 
QIPs unit within 5 days of each PRC meeting.  
The next section focuses on the creation of “Memorandum of Understanding” 
(MOU) for each approved project. Once the PRC has the approved projects, the QIPs unit 
will have to initiate the next steps of the implementation process regarding commitment 
of funds, signature of MOU if necessary and prepare the first installment. If a non-UN 
body undertakes the implementation, the QIPs unit will have to produce a MOU in 
cooperation with the project officer in the field, which will be signed between the mission 
and the implementing partner.  
The financial process includes the commitment of funds and the disbursement of 
installments. The QIPs program officer is in charge of obtaining the Budget Section 
Clearance, the DMS certification and the Finance Section/Accounts Unit approval in 
order to get the commitment number. Once the latter is received, the QIPs program 
officer will submit the first installment request to the Finance unit in order for the field 
finance officer to receive the first payment. Because there is no bond or bank guarantee, 
the SOP advises MONUSCO staff to limit the first payment to a maximum ranging from 
$15,000 to $25,000 for projects that would exceed $35,000 of total budget. For the same 
financial security reasons, the second and third installment should be based on project 
advancement. The last part of this section states that “exceptional cases,”54 identified by 
the DMS office based on the Head of Office’s recommendations, could lead to the 
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disbursement of a bigger first installment. The finance officer is responsible for ensuring 
that the financial aspects of QIPs are correctly monitored and that a financial report is 
submitted through the Head of Office. 
Next to the financial disbursement part, the implementation and monitoring 
section explains that the project officer will ensure the completion of the projects 
however the agreed time-frame is defined by the PRC. The monitoring visit needs to be 
reported, and such report has to be sent to the QIPs unit. The designation of an 
appropriate project officer is the responsibility of the Head of Office and the responsible 
section. This part also mentions the necessity for the Public Information Division and the 
Public Information officers to adequately publicize the QIPs in order to maximize 
visibility and therefore the confidence-impact of each project on the targeted population. 
Lastly, the report encourages the mission to organize monthly meeting in order to discuss 
the implementation progress, and if any discuss challenges and possible ways to address 
them. These briefing should be reported to the QIPs unit so the latter can produce a report 
on monitoring and evaluation and further improved the guidance for implementing QIPs 
based on field experience.  
The final part of the SOP report states the importance of an appropriate closure 
and evaluation of QIPs. Therefore, it is expected of the project officer to organize a site 
visit and to fill in the “Project Closure and Evaluation Form” which s/he will then submit 
to the QIPs unit program officer. The implementing partner should also produce a report 
that should be submitted a week after the final site visit. Following the administrative 
reporting, the project officer, in collaboration with the Head of Office, should organize a 
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“hand-over ceremony” with the presence of relevant local authorities and the 
MONUSCO PI component. 
At the beginning of each new fiscal year, the QIPs unit program manager, with 
the office of the DSRSG should produce an evaluation report on the previous year. The 
annual evaluation is supposed to include: “a statistical overview of mission mandate 
priorities advanced through QIPs funds, an overview of Management QIPs program, the 
impact of QIPs program, best practices, lessons-learned, recommendations and 
observations.”55 This report brings closure to the previous year however, it could also 
become a very effective tool to improve the effectiveness in the management of QIPs by 
providing visibility on challenges and achievements and to leave space for field officers 
to make observations about their work and therefore facilitate communication between 
the headquarters and the field.  
Use and Purpose of QIPs 
The policy and the guidelines insist that the QIPs’ primary focus must be on 
building confidence. The MONUSCO SOP sums it up in three goals: “promoting 
acceptance of the Mission’s mandated tasks, contributing to building confidence in the 
peace building process and contributing to improving the environment for effective 
mandate implementation.”56 When selecting QIPs, the proposals should include at least 
one of the three goals to become relevant and potentially accepted. The QIPs at 
MONUSCO are therefore used to ensure the effectiveness of the overall mission, to 
facilitate the work of the UN staff by developing a stable and confidence-focus system on 
which they could build long-term projects. Indeed, as the most recent Security Council 
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resolution encourages MONUSCO, confidence building should become a priority if 
MONUSCO wants to observe changes in the populations’ opinion of their work and thus 
facilitate the stabilization process, which is one of the larger goal of the Mission.  
V. explained in her answers that the main purposes of this fiscal year at 
MONUSCO was in the “restoration of state authorities and Islands of Stability.”57Indeed 
according to her 75% of the funds goes to support in creation of islands of stability. 
Islands of stability are based on the new directives given by the Security Council on the 
importance of stabilization. In the resolution 2098 of March 2013, the Security Council 
created the “Force Intervention Brigade,” a first offensive strategy led by MONUSCO to 
force peace into areas of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Its primary goal, in 
cooperation with the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo 
(FARDC), is“neutralizing and disarming small groups” as stated in the paragraph 12b of 
the resolution.58 The QIPs are now taking the same directions towards these islands of 
stability where, once the areas are being cleared of armed groups, stabilization activities 
should be put in place. However, an activist at Oxfam was warning last year of these 
islands of stability which, by focusing on only one purpose, the neutralization of armed 
groups, tend to put other critical issues on the side.59 She further criticizes the non-
sustainable characteristic of these “short-lived military victories.”60 According to Cooper, 
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58 Security Council of the United Nations, Resolution 2098, S/RES/2098, March 28th, 
2013, p7.  
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the greatest threat emerging from these islands of stabilities is the creation of confusion 
between humanitarian aid and the MONUSCO political agenda.  
This critique underscores the importance for QIPs to focus on these islands in 
order to bring confidence in the military offensive led by MONUSCO. As stated in the 
SOP, QIPs become a tool for the mission to “promote acceptance, contribute to building 
confidence and improve the environment for effective mandate implementation.” 
Moreover, V. mentions in her answers the importance of implementing QIPs based on a 
sustainable structure: “many QIPs have a component of sustainability and request 
establishing so called “monitoring committees.”61 However, she does not clearly explain 
how this scope of sustainability is really established. Indeed, she further says, “but in 
general no major follow up is done after QIPs.”62 She therefore accepts that there is no 
proper connection between the moment the QIP is being implemented and its longevity 
on the long term. It is important to bear in mind that it is not because a project is 
implemented short-term that it should have short-term longevity, however MONUSCO 
QIPs in their SOP strictly explains that the future of the project will not be MONUSCO’s 
responsibility but the implementing partners’. This issue of sustainability might create 
tension if the projects, holding promises of confidence and trust, happen to be abandoned 
by the mission.  
The MONUSCO QIPs, as observed in other missions, are confronted with the 
problem of connecting short-term implementation and long-term longevity of projects. 
Indeed, after the final evaluation that occurs following the closure ceremony, it seems 
that the bond between the mission and the project is neutralized and the mission could no 
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longer be held responsible for its future. It is therefore important for the mission to bring 
visibility to its role, and what the population should expect from it. If there is confusion 
in what is expected of the mission, there will be more room for tension and the climate of 
trust built during the implementation process will be ruined. This is an issue that should 
be properly assessed in order to determine whether or not the confidence environment is 
correlated to the short-term nature of the project implementation.  
Another important aspect of the implementation of QIPs is the 
bureaucratic environment in which UN personnel have to work. Although V. is a UN 
staff member working for the QIPs unit, she only has been to the QIPs site once or twice. 
She is caught in an administrative structure which prevents her and her colleagues from 
implementing the public relations goals which are the purpose of these projects. There 
does not seem to be any feedback from the local people on the confidence building 
impact of the projects.  
 
  
45 
 
Chapter VI: UNMIL – United Missions Mission in Liberia 
 
UNMIL Background: 
 
Liberia entered in a cycle of violence when in 1980 Samuel Doe organized a coup 
d’état with a group of 17 young army officers killing the president, William Richard 
Tolbert, Jr., along with 24 members of his security staff and of his government. Although 
extremely violent, Samuel Doe’s coup gained consequent popularity among the Liberians 
when he expressed his will to defend the long-oppressed population. However, his 
political control soon involved oppressions to americo-liberians and to indigenous people 
that would not be part of his ethnicity (Krahn).63 After several years in power the Doe’s 
government was starting to crumble when an army rebellion called the National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia led by Charles Taylor attacked from Côte d’Ivoire. In six months this 
rebel group recruited ten thousand armed men and was therefore able to capture a 
consequent part of the Liberian territory including important locations such as Buchanan, 
the second largest city in the country. This military progress forced the Economic 
Community of West Africa to offer a peace deal. In 1990, Doe’s government unwillingly 
accepted an ECOWAS proposal that included a ceasefire, the deployment of a 
peacekeeping force called ECOMOG and the formation of a new government of national 
unity.64 
Soon after and although under the supervision of ECOMOG, Doe was murdered 
by Prince Yormie Johnson’s armed men after they were invited to discuss a peace 
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arrangement. Prince Yormie Johnson was a collaborator of the NPFL, however contrary 
to Doe’s contingent, which was forced by ECOMOG to disarm, the INPFL kept their 
arsenal and was able to capture, torture and then killed the president and his group.  
As it is clearly explained by Farrall in his article Recurring dilemmas in a 
recurring conflict: Evaluating UN mission in Liberia (2003-2006), the following 13 years 
were illustrated by moments of peace and return to conflict.65 Charles Taylor became a 
leader and was able to gain military control over a vast majority of the Liberian territory. 
In July 1997, he finally legitimized his power thanks to political elections promoted by 
the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). Meanwhile, the country fell 
into a new cycle of conflicts opposing the Taylor’s government to two armed groups, the 
Liberians United for Reconciliations (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in 
Liberia (MODEL). Over the next six years, Taylor’s power was confined to the city of 
Monrovia.  
In 2003, Taylor left office after the rebel groups gained most of the Liberian 
territory and put Monrovia under siege. President Bush offered to support the deployment 
of a Peace Operation under the condition that Taylor would leave his office. However, 
ECOWAS got in-between and made a deal with Taylor in which their armed force would 
be immediately deployed and Taylor would be exiled to Nigeria. Then, after three months 
ECOMIL would be replaced by a UN peace operation. In August 2003, the three major 
parties to the conflict, the Liberian government, LURD and MODEL met in Ghana to 
sign the “Comprehensive Peace Agreement that included a transitional period of two and 
a half year, which would enable the establishment of a shared transitional government.  
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The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established under chapter VII of 
the United Nations Charter to monitor the Peace process, and was also mandated to 
facilitate the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation of the armed forces 
as well as help this transitional government in the reform of the security sector.66 
Since then UNMIL mandate has comprehended: “enabling the transition of full security 
responsibility to the Liberia National Police by strengthening its capabilities, promoting 
human rights, supporting national process of reconciliation, constitutional reform, and 
decentralization, enhancing support for security sector and rule of law reform, supporting 
the participation of women in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding, 
enhancing cooperation with ONUCI for the stabilization of border area and coordinating 
and collaborating with the Peacebuilding Commission on its engagement in Liberia, 
ensuring regular interaction with the civilian population to raise awareness and 
understanding about its mandate and activities.67 
 
Since June 2014 the development process of Liberia has been put on hold, as the 
attempt to control the spread of the Ebola Virus Disease epidemic has become the 
priority. Indeed, in the UNMIL progress report to the Security Council under the United 
States Presidency, Karin Langdren, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, 
expressed her concerns by qualifying the crisis as “the greatest threat since the war”68 and 
therefore explained that the majority of her report would focus on the matter.  
Furthermore, according to the Liberian Ministry of Health, there is over 2070 reported 
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cases and more than 1200 deaths as of August 2014. The SRSG of Liberia also attempted 
to enlighten the Security Council members on the different ways in which the crisis has 
spread. Firstly, she mentioned the exponential growth of this crisis, and explained that 
cultural rituals of death, given the epidemic, became extremely dangerous and only the 
full commitment of both religious and traditional leaders would enable UNMIL and the 
Liberian government to replace these traditions by safer ones, thus avoiding a 
consequential increase in the reported cases. She continued her report by mentioning the 
lack of confidence coming from an important part of the population, which rejects the 
importance of Ebola or to an extreme point even rejects its whole existence. Then she 
devoted an important part of her review on the infrastructural problems that emerged due 
to the epidemic crisis and forced the public system to undertake extreme measures such 
as the closings of schools and markets and most importantly the closing of borders apart 
from a few exceptions. In a public allocution, she listed other issues that were developed 
due to the crisis: the increase of prices, the expected cut by more than half of the 
economic growth, the deceleration of trades, the fact that many farmers had to stop 
tending their field, even though agriculture is a pilar of the Liberian economic and social 
system and lastly children are currently prevented from going to school, among other 
important issues. 69  Moreover, she reported the decision of the National Elections 
Commission to postpone the mid-term senatorial elections, initially taking place on 
October 14th, 2014. She then reinforces the importance of giving clarity to the Liberians 
in this time of uncertainty. 
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49 
 
The other part of this chapter will focus on the different Quick Impact Projects 
that has been implemented in the past and those recently chosen to support the Liberian 
government in dealing with this epidemic crisis.  
UNMIL Quick Impact Project Initiatives: 
 
Liberia has been profoundly affected by the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD). 
Although the epidemic seems to be receding, The World Bank published in January 2015 
a final report on the matter in order to raise awareness of the impact of the Ebola 
outbreak on the social and economic life of the Liberians. The result are worrying as it 
confirmed that "even with improvements in the health situation, the economy continues 
to shed jobs faster than they are replaced."70 It is even more perturbing as the Ebola 
stigma could become a threat to the stability that Liberia has been able to achieve so far. 
Indeed, negative socio-economic impacts such as an increase in the unemployment rate, 
or the spiking prices of basic necessities such as rice or local produce, due to the impact 
that the epidemic had on agricultural work, can lead to food insecurity and to potential 
conflict. As the chart in the World Bank report illustrates71, the increasing prices of rice 
can be explained due to the closing of public places such as markets or the difficult 
accessibility of fresh produce and rice to urban areas, among other issues. However, the 
report seems to give more concern to the lack of consumer resources as a threat to food 
security, as many work places had to shut down. A large part of the Liberian population 
lost a consequential part of their general income, obviously impacted their capacity to 
sustain themselves. Indeed, as the World Bank report noticed, " many in wage labor are 
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not working because their business or government office is closed, and very few have 
been able to return or find alternative employment."72 
The tough socio-economic impacts can have tremendous repercussions on the 
stability of a country especially if the latter is still very fragile. In the case of Liberia, 
QIPs are very important for different reasons: First of all, attempting to fill the basic 
needs in communities that erupted with the crisis, secondly, to assure that the population 
stays confident about the mandate and the mission, especially during the crisis and lastly, 
to support the national government in handling the situation. 
Similarly to the other case-studies, this chapter attempts to analyze the work of 
the UNMIL QIPs team on Rule of Law issues and witness the achievements and 
shortcomings of the mission in responding to the mandate stated in Resolution 2066 of 
the Security Council. 
The mandate and QIPs 
The resolution 2066 states that the rule of law, which is part of the peace-building 
process, is one of the "key areas"73 to which the Mission should give priority. The QIPs 
thus become a very important tool for the Mission to assist the government in "the reform 
and restructuring of the Justice Sector."74 The Security Council also asks the Liberian 
government to coordinate and collaborate with UNMIL in order to reinforce its public 
institutions. Therefore QIPs are used in order to create a genuine bond between partners, 
facilitate the relationships and build cooperation. In order to accurately gather 
information on QIPs in Liberia, a questionnaire was sent to the QIPs Team in UNMIL. 
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The participants have background in the corrections field. They are civilian staffs from 
many different country75, with a professional experience in their national prison of at 
least 15 years. As the interviewees explained in the case of Rule of Law, they would 
assist the government in "supply of EVD items in order to avoid the spread of Ebola in 
the facilities." 76  The interviewees have to assist corrections facilities through QIPs 
initiatives, because prison officers can transmit the disease inside and outside the 
infrastructure, therefore aggravating the case of Ebola. Moreover, these confined 
establishments with often no proper health system, have higher chances to witness a rapid 
spread of the disease without having durable solutions. The contamination of detainees 
would require the corrections facilities to find ways to transport the sick to hospitals and 
assure their well-being while guaranteeing security. QIPs thus become not a solution but 
a mean for prevention.  
The Security Council is clear when stating that the State of Liberia is responsible 
for the reform of its public institutions, especially in the rule of law area. However, it also 
mentions the duty of UNMIL to properly assist the government in reaching complete 
autonomy. QIPs was recently used as a preventive tool for the spread of Ebola, however 
it has always been considered as a general tool to assist the government in reconnecting 
with its population through the development or reinforcement of public institutions, 
particularly regarding the Justice and Corrections system. The interviewees explained in 
their responses that QIPs, which were initially planned to only be used for two or three 
years, has been used on a longer period because it became a solution to "the limited 
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resources of the national partners."77 QIPs therefore become a budget option to achieve 
part of the mandate, reforming the justice and corrections system for instance, and 
therefore strengthening the whole Rule of Law system in Liberia. The UNMIL mandate 
changed from being purely peace-keeping to becoming a peace-building mission, 
attempting to restructure norms and institutions that are vital for the long-term stability of 
a country like Liberia, which has suffered decades of civil war and human rights 
violations. The UNMIL mandate, as previously mentioned is thus focusing on the 
Security Sector Reform, rule of law and human rights. As any institutional reform, the 
process of change is tremendously long and sinuous. QIPs are therefore used to provide 
fast-paced improvements that could assist the government in bringing rapid changes to 
the population. Indeed, QIPs policy describes their use as to assist in developing a good 
relationship between the Mission and the national partners, however, it is also accurate to 
notice that it may also consequently improve relations between the government and its 
population, therefore strenghtheing stability. UNMIL is here to provide assistance and 
guidance, however the government is often the main stakeholder in the endeavor when it 
comes to reforming the rule of law. The interviewees described the mandate as follows:  
 Providing strategic and technical advice on corrections issues 
 Provide support, expertise and guidance on penal reforms 
 Support the infrastructural development and expansion of the Bureau's 
facilities 
 Develop the Bureau's human resource through mentoring 
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 Train the Corrections staff in modern prison management and human 
rights 
 (more recently) Support the national partners to prevent the spread of 
Ebola in the facilities 
The mandate illustrates the importance of training and supporting the government staff on 
their renovation of public institutions, including the importance of establishing practices 
that respects human rights norms as promoted by the international community.  
The actors involved 
One of the interesting aspect in analyzing different UN Missions and the 
implementation of their QIPs is to notice the plurality of actors involved. Of course, the 
national government and the population of the host country as partners for QIPs provide 
an indirect tool for the nation as much as they are tools for the Mission. In the case of 
Liberia, along with the regular partners such as UNDP, UNICEF, UN Women, UNHCR 
or international organizations such as WHO or ICRC and local NGOs, there are also 
partnerships that are singular to Liberia. As it is stated in the Resolution 2066, the 
Mission was asked to work closely with the Peace-building Commission which became a 
QIPs partner to help develop strong and sustainable infrastructures. Other partners 
include, the Food and Agricultural organization and others such as German Agro, Prison 
Fellowship, Carter Centre, the Justice for Peace Commission and the American Bar 
Association which provide assistance for the reform of the Justice and Corrections 
systems. Others include the organization of Health, Agriculture, and Development for 
Sustainability (HANDS), and lastly the Defense for Children.  
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The work within such a plurality of actors could become very sensitive, raising 
conflicts and problems of overlapping practices. However, the UNMIL interviewee 
seems to be confident in the creation of good relations between all partners. As an 
example, he gives the construction of two facilities in Fishtown and Cestos which was 
done jointly with the Joint Sexual Gender Based Violence (SGBV) group and was a 
success. He further explains that in order to avoid overlapping work, "close 
coordination"78 is a priority when implementing QIPs, which on the down side could lead 
to major delays for all the parties to agree on a project.  
The other interesting point when it comes to analyzing partners is the issue of 
eligibility. The interviewees stated that this is a concerning point regarding QIPs because 
neither the Guidelines nor the Policy are strictly specific regarding the selection of 
implementing partners. It is informally agreed that any type of actors could participate in 
these projects. However, it could also become an issue of time, if the UNMIL QIPs team 
has to research and monitor each potential partner to make certain that any affiliation to 
political, religious, social parties would not turn into the instrumentalization of a project 
and therefore favor a community to the detriment of another.  In order to do so, the 
interviewees further explained, the UNMIL team has to analyze "the political (or 
religious) profile of a given implementing partner, the capacity and reliability of the 
implementing partner and their relationship to the identified project site host 
community."79 
Another problem raised concerning the plurality of partners is the difference in 
the expectations of the outcome. Indeed, because each partner has a different mandate, 
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they might expect a different result in order to consider the project effective. The 
singularity of the mandate leads to a singularity of achievements and therefore might 
create disappointment or confusion. It was also mentioned that the government expressed 
concerns regarding the short-term nature of the projects. The public authority may 
misinterpret these projects and consider them as potential long-term initiatives to respond 
to a long-term goal, when they are, as defined by the interviewee, "seed money projects."  
Categories of QIPs 
QIPs categories are usually similar among the different missions. Three kinds of 
categories in UNMIL can be defined: 1/ the promotion of acceptance of the mandated 
tasks and support of credibility of the work achieved by the mission; 2/ contribution to 
building confidence in the peace process and strengthening support in this process 
through “demonstrating early dividends of stability to the population”80; 3/ contribution 
to improving the environment for the mandate implementation including “through 
addressing immediate needs of the population.” 81  These general categories are then 
supported by practical categories which in the case of Corrections QIPs are as follows: 
prison infrastructural improvements, training of corrections staff, support of prisoners’ 
rehabilitation programmes, spiritual and social welfare services, and in the recent months 
the supply of EVD items to prevent the spread of Ebola in the prison facilities. These 
categories of QIPs are supporting the long-term work of the mission by assisting the 
government in getting institutions that will not only protect civilians but also the basic 
rights of its population while improving the security of the communities. By improving 
the well-being of the incarcerated population and developing infrastructure and a 
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Corrections system that would respect the International Minimum Standard Rules,82 
security would be improved on two levels: the renovation of prisons obviously assures 
the physical security of detainees and prison staff, but it could also have a positive impact 
on detainees’ behavior. For instance, the rehabilitation program is tremendously 
important to train the detainees professionally and to a larger extent avoid a recurrence of 
criminality.  
The Corrections QIPs represents 12% of the total QIPs and has been focusing 
mostly on renovation and construction work and on training of staff (60 projects in total) 
all done in coordination with the Bureau of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 
The implementation cycle 
The QIPs are all undertaken in consultation with representatives of national and 
local authorities, and where appropriate, with the participation of local communities. The 
Head of Field Office is a major pillar of the implementation cycle in Liberia as it is the 
one which interprets the mandate in correlation with defining geographic and thematic 
priority in the selection of QIPs. Indeed, the Field Office is significant in the QIPs choice 
because their constant presence on the field make them more aware of the needs of the 
communities and therefore more relevant in carefully choosing QIPs theme to fit both the 
local needs and the mandate requirements. The other pillar is obviously the constant 
cooperation with external actors. Then, it is the role of the Head of Mission to establish a 
Project Review Committee. Once projects are accepted, the responsibility of monitoring 
the implementation is given to the appropriate component representative, and work with 
the finance department is set up. With regards to finance, the Director of Mission Support 
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is in charge of setting out the conditions for financial management and ensuring that the 
allocation of funds is in accordance with the UN financial rules and regulations. For 
instance, these rules ask for the QIPs team to use wire transfer as a way of payment and 
prohibit the use of cash. The latter being very unsafe because it quickly becomes 
untraceable and prevent the whole monitoring process from being truly effective. 
Interviewees from different missions raised the problem of having implementing partners 
disappearing with the money before wiring transfer were introduced. Although, other 
comments were made on the difficult process that a wire transfer requires in a country 
witnessing a state of institutionalization and reconstruction.   
Use and purpose 
There is a two-level confidence building system in the implementation of QIPs. 
First, it helps the UNMIL Mission to develop legitimacy in its support of the government 
and thus creates good relationships between the public authority and the civilian staff. On 
the other hand, it also helps the work of the peacekeepers to be considered by the 
population not as an occupation force but rather as a positive assisting dynamism. 
Therefore, instead of having some antagonist energy between the mission and the 
national actors, a strong link of cooperation is developed facilitating the work of the 
Mission while consequently improving the well-being of the population. Another fact 
worth noting is the subliminal creation of a mutual trust between the host government and 
its population. Indeed, with the constant participation of public offices in the QIPs, the 
population may develop a better understanding of their expectations as citizens toward 
their State. It is of major importance for stability to be sustainable that the population 
starts acknowledging their role and rights in their society. The involvement of civil 
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society in these projects further enhances the importance of representation and civil 
action in a democratic space. Indeed, QIPs can also work on a political basis, as being a 
tool to respond to the population needs, and most importantly, become a tool for the 
community to express these needs. The use and purpose of QIPs is important in a state of 
volatile stability as it develops relations between actors that were not accustomed to 
participate in such social dynamics. It is obvious that the primary goal of QIPs is to build 
confidence between the Mission and external actors, however, it also informally becomes 
an educative tool for the community and the government to participate in the stabilization 
process. Peace-building is such a sinuous endeavor that QIPs provides quick results and 
strengthen the credibility of all actors within the peace process. This is only when actors 
can observe results that the legitimacy of the Mission can be reinforced. Consequently, 
this is only when the work of the Mission is accepted that it becomes truly effective. 
Achieving mandated tasks is one part of the whole peace projects, as if there is no 
recognition of such advancements, the population and its government will never be able 
to stabilize peace when the Mission will leave the country. 
It is particularly relevant to state that the use of QIPs in post-conflict context, is 
subject to perpetual uncertainty. The theory in which QIPs are required to build 
confidence and facilitate the work of the mission is stated both in the Guidelines and in 
the policy. But this theory does not take into consideration all the difficulties listed by the 
UNMIL team such as “the high volatility of political stability, the occurrence of 
corruption, the unreliability of public infrastructure, the difficulty to deal with weather 
conditions, price fluctuations and public strife.”83 The latter are part of a common disease 
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that many post-conflict countries experience. The unstable political realm, the political 
bigotry often give possibilities of fraud and political misconduct. These troubles can lead 
to drastic outcome such as the collapse of all the achievements and the fall back into 
conflict. All these problems need to be assessed and avoided by the UNMIL QIPs team in 
order to circumvent any issue and loss of legitimacy.   
The interviewees also listed several recurrent complications that are often 
delaying the operational practice of QIPs in Liberia and lessen consequently the positive 
impact that QIPs may have on the overall effectiveness of the mission. There are constant 
logistics problems, such as a complicated or even impossible access to project sites, the 
lack of business acumen among the local contractors or the fluctuation of prices…84  
Although important difficulties may delay the implementation cycle of QIPs, 
UNMIL has delegated the work of conducting an assessment review to the Joint Mission 
Analysis Centre in 2014 and the result were positive and shown that the QIPs have been 
“highly successful in restoring authority and capacity-building within local 
communities.”85 However, the interviewees stated that UNMIL needed to refocus QIPs’ 
priorities toward livelihood generation programmes and socio-economic access to basic 
services in order to generate decentralization and the strengthening of local ownership of 
QIPs to assure the longevity of improving conditions created by the projects.  
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Chapter VII: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH) 
 
MINUSTAH Background 
In 1990 the provisional government of Haiti sought the assistance of the United 
Nations, which became the first mission to Haiti to strengthen the free and fair 
proceedings of the national election. The resolution of March 1990 established the United 
Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH).This 
mission was jointly supervised by the Member States and the Organization of American 
States to achieve the peaceful occurrence of the national elections in Haiti and more 
broadly assist in the support of the economic and social development efforts of the 
country. Such an endeavor necessitated the gathering of the first fifty-observer group that 
assisted in the implementation of democratic elections; more observers arrived during the 
time of registration and elections in order to assure a peaceful and fair proceeding. Lastly, 
two or three advisers were requested to bring assistance to the coordinating committee for 
the security of the elections. 
ONUVEH reported that the election occurred without major incidents and 
therefore the Haitian population had, for the first time, participated in a democratic 
election where Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president. In 1991, a military coup led 
by Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras evicted the newly elected government and the 
political and social situation dramatically worsened. On October 2nd, Secretary-General 
Javier Pérez de Cuéllar stated that the international community was hoping to see the 
return to power of the rightful government in accordance to the Haitian constitution. The 
OAS ministers of foreign affairs also demanded the return of President Aristide and thus 
echoed the statement of Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar although in a tougher voice. 
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Indeed, they asked for a complete isolation of Haiti until the legitimate government was 
reinstated. Soon after their demand, they sent a delegation to Haiti but the Army soon 
expelled it from the territory. A few days later, the two Haitian Chambers were forced by 
the military to appoint a new president, a prime minister. The OAS reacted to the illegal 
appointment of the new heads of administration by adopted a new resolution to condemn 
the creation of any illegitimate government that could result from this undemocratic 
coup. Two days after the statement made by the foreign ministers of the OAS, the United 
Nations matched their declaration and asked all member states to assist the OAS in 
achieving their mandates.  
In February 1993, the Secretary-General decided to dispatch a preliminary team 
in order to prepare the arrival of the UN component of the Mission to Haiti. The UN and 
the OAS jointly managed the mission and therefore a Head of Mission appointed by both 
parties directed the mission’s operations. By the end of May, the operation team 
comprised of more than a hundred personnel. In June, following the submission of a 
human rights report that listed multiple violations, along with the statement from the 
Permanent representative of Haiti in New York that explained that the constitutional 
order was not yet restored and thus requested the international community to put a 
mandatory embargo on oil and arms. The Security Council answered the request on June 
16th and the members adopted a resolution86 that obligated States to prevent the sale or 
supply of any kind of defensive or offensive weapons from their territory or their 
nationals. The Security Council members also forbid the sale of oil87 and lastly, they 
                                                        
86 Security Council, Resolution 841 on the situation in Haiti, June 16th 1993 
87 In the exception of humanitarian use. See Resolution 841 above mentioned. 
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decided to freeze all funds in the name of the government of Haiti, hoping to encourage 
Army General Raoul Cédras, to join negotiations with President Aristide.  
In the end of June, Army General Raoul Cédras accepted the Special Envoy’s 
invitation to meet with Jean-Bertrand Aristide. They met on July 3rd in New York and 
were able to reach an agreement in which the mission’s presence was maintained in order 
to modernize the Armed Force and to assist in establishing a new Police force. Following 
the meeting, the Security Council suspended the sanctions and on July 16, 1993, the 
parties agreed to a six-month truce. Although an agreement had been signed, the political 
situation soon deteriorated. In September 1993, reports stated that human rights 
violations and deep mistrust between political parties occurred on a daily basis. This 
political turmoil hurried the creation and deployment of UNMIH, the first UN 
peacekeeping operation to Haiti.  Despite the deployment of UNMIH, the political 
circumstances only worsened. The military broke the agreement by not reinstated 
President Aristide and prevented also the UNMIH team from deploying. Therefore, in 
December 1993 the UNMIH mandate was extended in order to improve the lack of 
progress concerning the agreements signed in New York City. The Security Council had 
long terminated the suspension of sanctions however the provisional president, in July 
1994, announced that MICIVIH was no longer desirable. On July 31st, 1994 and after 
months of diplomatic failures, the Security Council passed resolution 940 under chapter 
VII and authorized a multinational forces to use "all necessary means" to ease the 
military departure on one hand and the return of the legitimate president and his 
government on the other hand. In September 1994, the multinational force was deployed 
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and achieved a peaceful implementation of the terms of resolution 940. In March 1995, 
UNMIH took over the peace operations in Haiti. 
UNMIH was replaced by the United Nations Mission Support in Haiti 
(UNSMIH) and Haiti witnessed their first hand-over of power between two 
democratically elected presidents. Thus, it announced the need for a new type of 
assistance, which was established through resolution 1063, on June 28, 1996. It had, 
among other mandated tasks, to assist the government of Haiti in creating, maintaining 
and strengthening a stable environment through the reinforcement and professionalization 
of the Haitian National Police (HNP)88. The government of Haiti had been extremely 
determined to develop and strengthen their rule of law institutions in accordance to 
human rights norms. Although the progress was consequential the HNP was still lacking 
the experience and confidence to control on subversive groups endangering the peace and 
democratic process in Haiti, therefore the mandate was extended until May 1997. In July, 
the recently appointed Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed that despite the progress 
made the challenges were still important. It necessitates the establishment of a new 
mission capable of managing the progress that has been made while effectively handling 
the transitional challenges.  
On April 30, 2004, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH) was established through resolution 1542. Although the mandate was quite 
similar to the previous missions, the difference was in the size of the civilian force 
dispatched in the country. Indeed, UNMIH was only composed of 160 international 
                                                        
88 UNITED NATIONS Security Council, resolution 1063, S/RES/1063, June 28, 1996, 
p2.  
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civilian staff,89 UNSMIH 119 civilian personnel90, and MINUSTAH had 550 civilian 
officers.91  This large number of civilian affair staff was required in order to further 
strengthen the National Police, restore and maintain the rule of law institutions, support 
the constitutional and political process, the human rights monitoring and last but not least 
assist the Haitian government in their Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
program 92 . Not only peace and security had to be secured and stabilized, but the 
reinforcement of public authority was to be prioritized through the processes of peace-
building and capacity building.  
The earthquake in 2010 tremendously weakened Haiti. With 220,000 people 
dead and more than 1.5 million left homeless, the natural catastrophe had a profound 
impact on the political and social climate throughout the country. The United Nations 
therefore authorized the temporary increase in personnel to counter the calamitous 
situation.  
In November 2010, another wave of political turmoil occurred after accusations 
of fraud were made following the release of the primary results regarding the presidential 
elections, which consequently led to another outbreak of violence. The Security Council 
then made a statement calling for peaceful and democratic elections. In February 2011, 
the final results of the first round of presidential and legislative elections were released, 
                                                        
89 UNMIH facts and figures : 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmihfacts.html 
90 UNSMIH facts and figures: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unsmihfacts.html 
91 MINUSTAH figures: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/background.shtml 
92 United Nations Security Council, S/RES/1542, April 30 2004, p3 
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two months later the results showed that Michel Martelly was democratically elected 
president of Haiti.  
In both 2011 and 2012 through resolutions 2012 and 2070 respectively, UN 
personnel were decreased in MINUSTAH after the release of the Secretary-General’s 
report93 in which he stated that a decrease in the police and military force would not be a 
threat to the security in Haiti. In the latter resolution, the Security Council acknowledged 
"that the overall security situation while fragile has improved since the adoption of its 
resolutions 1908, 1927 and 1944, and remained relatively stable since the adoption of its 
resolution 2012 (2011)."94 
The situation in Haiti is in a process where the strengthening of public 
institutions has been understood as a fundamental step in the construction of a stabilized 
social and political system. Indeed, as in the two previous study-cases (UNMIL and 
MONUSCO), it can be seen that peacekeeping is strongly intertwined in the concept of 
rule of law and capacity-building. The next step in our analysis is to understand how 
Quick Impact Projects work in such dynamics, and whether or not it helps the United 
Nations Missions in assisting the state to reinforce its public authority while respecting 
the fundamental rights and well-being of its population.  
                                                        
93 Secretary-General's report: Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations  
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (S/211/540), 25 August 2011 
94 Resolution 2070 (2012) adopted by the Security Council at its 6845th meeting, 12 
October 2012. p1 
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MINUSTAH Quick Impact Projects intiatives  
 
This part of the MINUSTAH chapter examines how QIPs are being used and 
implemented. In order to be able to develop a framework of evaluation that would enable 
an adequate assessment for the impact of QIPs on the effectiveness of a mission, it is 
important to first understand if there is a generality in their use among missions. 
Therefore, interviews were conducted with each person in charge of QIPs. In the case of 
MINUSTAH, the mission mandated through resolution 1542 on April 30th 2004, an 
interview was conducted via email, and has been analyzed in parallel to the report they 
produced in 2011. The focal point who accepted to participate in the interview is a lawyer 
and journalist and has worked for MINUSTAH since June 2006. His responsibilities are 
directed towards the strengthening of the rule of law in Haiti, more precisely in the 
Justice department. Surely, deeper research would enable a greater spectrum of 
interviewees and further the accuracy of the research, however for the time being, as 
previously mentioned, this analysis will focus on the peace-building and rule of law 
initiatives of the mission, without ignoring the profound impact it could have on the 
security level. 
This part will be divided into sub-parts in order to understand the implementation 
cycle, the role of the different stakeholders, the use and nature of QIPs and of course, the 
shortcomings and achievements that have been observed since the first QIPs were 
created.  
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The mandate and QIPs 
 
The Quick Impact projects in MINUSTAH officially started in 2004, a year after 
the Brahimi report recommended a better focus on the consolidation of a climate of trust 
between the population and the mission. As the interviewee stated, "the objective of 
MINUSTAH was firstly to reestablish peace and public stability in Haiti in order to 
facilitate a political transition through the hosting of fair and free elections. Through the 
mandate, the other important goal aimed at toward the reinforcement of the National 
Police Force, in order to assure the security of the population after the Mission's 
departure." 95  But, in 2007, resolution 1702 extended the mandate to include the 
strengthening of rule of law in the Justice area. The mission was therefore asked to: 
assist with the restructuring and maintenance of the rule of law, public 
safety and public order, will provide assistance and advice to the Haitian 
authorities, in consultation with relevant actors, in monitoring, 
restructuring, reforming and strengthening of the justice sector, including 
through technical assistance to review all relevant legislation, the provision 
of experts to serve as professional resources, the rapid identification and 
implementation of mechanisms to address prison overcrowding and 
prolonged pre-trial detention and the coordination and planning of these 
activities, and invites the Government of Haiti to take full advantage of that 
assistance.96 
                                                        
95 Interview with a UN personnel at the UN Headquarters, August 13th 2014, p3  
96 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1702, S/RES/1702 (2006), p4 
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In 2007 it specifically required the mission "to maintain a proactive 
communications and public outreach strategy to improve public understanding of the 
mandate and the role of MINUSTAH in Haiti."97 
The mandate related to justice included a very detailed plan on how to assist the 
Haitian judicial system. Indeed, the mission had to reinforce the technical capacities of 
the judiciary, transfer know-how to the relevant actors in preparation of the mission's 
departure, and implement QIPs in order to maximize the climate of trust in association 
with the justice sector and the Superior Council of the Judicial Power. This part included 
the implementation of construction projects as stated in resolution 1927, in order to 
reconstruct some of the courts and tribunals that had been destroyed during the 2010 
earthquake. The mandate required the mission to support the justice commission to 
decrease the number of prolonged detentions, to organize research, and to publish the 
results. It also required the mission to assist the Ministry of Justice and Public Security in 
reintroducing the forensic institute, to assist the government in establishing the Superior 
Council of the Judiciary Power and to give judicial advice to other sectors of 
MINUSTAH. The role of QIPs is therefore to assist in these processes in order, on one 
hand, to strengthen the good relations between the actors of the host country and the 
mission, and on the other hand to reinforce the mission's legitimacy to assist the 
government. 98 
 
 
 
                                                        
97 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1743, S/RES/1743 (2007), p.4 
98 Ibid, Interview in french, p2 
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The actors involved in the Justice MINUSTAH QIPs program 
Quick Impact Projects include a large number of actors from different sectors. As 
the interviewee explained, the mission mostly deals with services of the government, and 
donors that he listed as follows: 
 Ministry of Justice and Public Security 
 Superior Council of the Judiciary 
 Forensic Institute 
 Ministry of Public Health and Population 
 Appeal Court of Port-au-Prince 
 Court of Cassation 
 United Nations Development Programme 
 Donors such as International Organization of Francophonie, USAID... 
The interview participant did not mention the role of grassroots NGOs. However, 
the mission’s 2012 Report reveals that NGOs and grassroots associations often propose 
projects that would help the community.99 Each stakeholder has a different role to play, 
either to propose, create or implement the projects in order to effectively complete the 
QIPs cycle, which will be further explained in the analysis. It appears that most 
stakeholders for the justice program of QIPs are from the public service. It might not be 
the case in all kind of QIPs, however, in the case of Justice, the mandate of MINUSTAH 
requires the development of a strong and fair judicial system and its development 
throughout the country. Its primary purpose is to reinforce on a longer term the rule of 
law institutions and the capacity of public infrastructures. The partnership between 
                                                        
99 MINUSTAH: Evaluation of MINUSTAH Quick Impact Projects, July 2012. p45 
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MINUSTAH and the government with regards to QIPs seems therefore part of a larger 
project than simply improving the confidence between the Mission and the host 
population. 
 
The different categories of QIPs 
Between 2004-2005, the year of the introduction of QIPs in Haiti, and 2011, the 
date of their most recent report, more than a thousand projects have been implemented by 
the MINUSTAH Quick Impact Project team and their partners. There are four categories 
that describe the different type of projects. Based on the chart below. 100 
 
101 
This chart shows the different categories and the quantity of projects that have 
been done each year. As we can see the number of projects, depending on the type, varies 
according to the year. In 2010-2011, given the assistance needed to reconstruct 
infrastructure after the hurricane, projects in the category infrastructure and public 
                                                        
100MINUSTAH Evaluation, Ibid. p.12-13 
101 Ibid, p14 
71 
 
services tremendously increased to answer the demand. Indeed, in order to build 
confidence between the mission and the host country MINUSTAH has had to answer the 
primary needs depending on the situation. QIPs have to be extremely practical and 
achieve important visibility in order to maximize the climate of trust. Because of its 
short-term nature, they had to answer primary needs coming from either the population or 
the local authorities in order to avoid turning the project outcomes into something 
elusive. Over the years, this would impact on the mission’s ability to work effectively. 
Therefore, as the chart shows, infrastructure remains the dominant category even though 
there are variations for the "training/ capacity building" and the "livelihood/employment 
generation" which have both consequently increased over the years. The "social services" 
projects stopped being a full category by 2009 and merged with the "infrastructure/public 
services" category102. 
The category "Infrastructure/public services" encompasses different subcategories 
of work such as construction and renovation, usually of public ownership, such as courts 
and tribunals, city halls, police stations and schools but also road repairs, shore protection 
and electrification projects. The social services used to include water distribution 
projects, sewage and canal cleaning but as previously mentioned it is now part of the 
former category. Another important category is the training and building capacity 
projects, whose primary purpose is to prepare and reinforce the state personnel capacity 
on issues such as human rights, gender or simply to assure the effectiveness of the public 
institutions. The report explains the work of the mission "as a response to the need to 
build capacity within the public service system following the 2006 local and general 
                                                        
102 Ibid, p14 
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elections and to enhance the decentralization process."103 The last part of this statement is 
interesting for this research. It reveals that not only do QIPs build a climate of trust, but 
in the case of MINUSTAH they also assists the state in building its own public 
infrastructure and therefore its own public legitimacy. This is in addition to making sure 
that they not only respect but strongly implement the international standards of 
democracy and human rights. The different stakeholders have therefore the duty to 
determine practically what is meant in the QIPs policy as a "contribution to promoting 
acceptance of the mandated tasks," "building confidence in the peace process" or 
"generating support for the mission."104 
 
The implementation cycle  
According to the guidelines, QIPs projects "should" follow a very strict cycle 
from creation to evaluation. Generally, it starts with the Identification and Review. This 
usually begins when an entity either public, private or directly within the mission 
proposes a project. According to the MINUSTAH QIPs representative "for all QIPs, you 
always need a demand from the national partner, which could be from a ministry, local 
authorities, a local judiciary authority or a grassroots NGO. This proposal is formulated 
directly in the region where the project may be implemented and the entity submitting it 
has the duty to inform the ministry in charge of the issue for which the QIP is being 
created. For instance, in the case of justice QIPs, the entity would have the responsibility 
to inform the Ministry of Justice and Public Safety in order to make sure that the project 
                                                        
103 Ibid. p14 
104 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field 
Support, Quick Impact Projects (QIPs): Policy, January 21 201 p2 
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would be sustainable.105 Once a project is initiated, it is sent to the MINUSTAH section 
that is in charge of leading it.106 This section will then work with the Department of Civil 
Affairs in order to deal with the QIP budget. Each department is entitled to their own part 
of the annual budget.107 
The next step in the cycle is the intervention of the Project Review Committee 
composed of representatives of every MINUSTAH section108 . This committee is the 
decisional branch of the process and is in charge of deciding whether or not a project 
proposal is feasible and can be approved.  
Based on the guidelines, each head of mission should establish a QIPs 
Management Team (QMT), however, in his interview, the MINUSTAH representative 
did not mention the QMT as a leading team for the creation or implementation of the 
project. The project, once accepted by the Review Committee is validated by the head of 
the Civil Affairs Team.  
Then, the Central office of Civil Affairs in Port-au-Prince sends the project 
proposal to the Finance Team, which finally reach the Division of Mission Support for 
the final part of the agreement process. The budget service sends the project to the 
Finance Team in order to release the funds, which is often 80% of the total amount.  
However, the funds are usually divided in two or three parts depending on the situation. 
As the guidelines advises, the missions should consider a 40/40/20 disbursement when 
                                                        
105 Interview in French with a MINUSTAH QIP Representative, August 2014, p7. See 
Annexes 
106 As an example, if the project is building a court, the Justice section of the Mission 
would be responsible for it.  
107 Ibid, Interview, August 2014, p7 
108 It is composed of UNPOL, UN Military. UH Human Rights, Justice team, Corrections 
Team, Gender Team and Civil Affairs 
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they deal with new implementing partners. Indeed, as another interviewee from the Civil 
Affairs Office at the UN headquarters in New York explained, it has happened that 
implementing partners would disappear with the money, obviously putting the whole 
mission and QIPs team in a complicated situation.109 
Once the first payment is made, the implementing partner starts the project. The 
way in which the project progresses is monitored depending on the requirements of the 
Mission. Nothing is clearly detailed at this level in the guidelines. For example, in the 
case of MINUSTAH, the mission asks the implementing partner and the entity who 
submits the idea to provide a financial statement with documents to substantiate the 
report. The goal is to explain with specific details the progress of the project and prove 
that the latter is either finished or soon to be finished. Once this report is submitted, the 
budget section analyzes it and if it considers that enough work has been achieved, asks 
the financial section to transfer the 20% remaining in the budget. The interviewee also 
explained that throughout the entire process of implementation, both justice and civil 
affairs officers from the regional office organize visits to monitor the progress of the 
project.  
The last part of the cycle, according to the guidelines, is the closure, evaluation of 
the project and the writing of the final report. Indeed, the missions are asked to develop 
annual reports on QIPs in order to assess their work throughout the year and inform the 
headquarters in NYC on any shortcomings and difficulties they had to overcome. In the 
case of MINUSTAH, an annual report has been developed in 2012 and gathers all their 
work since QIPs started in 2004-2005. The report summarizes the implementation 
                                                        
109  Interview with a UN personnel at the UN Headquarters, August 13th 2014 
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process and attempts to evaluate the impact that MINUSTAH QIPs had achieved. It is, 
apparently, the only substantive report that has been submitted by a mission since the 
implementation of the QIPs policy in the UN peacekeeping field. 
The use and purpose of QIPs 
The first QIPs Policy that was published by the UN headquarters defined the 
scope and purpose of QIPs as follows: promoting acceptance of the mandated tasks, 
building confidence in the peace process and generating support for the mission.110 These 
directives are quite general as it does not precisely inform the Mission on how QIPs 
would generate support and confidence. It simply advises the UN personnel in the field 
that their projects should follow these purposes but leaving them with the possibility of 
taking initiatives according to the situation they are currently dealing with. Obviously, the 
headquarters understood that figuring which type of projects would generate support is a 
task that only the people in the field can achieve, for it is a case-by-case process, not even 
nationally, but also regionally. Consequently, depending on the location of the QIPs, its 
nature will be different in order to respond to a specific need. As the interviewee 
explained in the case of MINUSTAH: "the goals and purposes of QIPs depends on the 
nature of the project."111 For instance, the construction or rehabilitation projects proposed 
by the government (through the request of a ministry) is usually aimed at improving the 
work conditions. As it was stated for the justice QIPs, "to provide a more appropriate 
framework to facilitate the effectiveness of the judiciary, to strengthen the prestige of the 
                                                        
110 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field 
Support, Quick Impact Projects : Policy , 12 February 2007. p 3  
111 Interview in French with a MINUSTAH QIPs Representative, August 2014, p6. See 
Annexes 
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Judiciary, and to smooth the fair and equitable distribution of Justice in a reasonable 
timeframe."112 
When it comes to QIPs training, their goal was to "build capacity within the 
public service system following the 2006 local and general elections and to enhance the 
decentralization process."113 Therefore, the purpose of QIPs is no longer about building 
confidence but also building capacity and to professionalize the public service personnel. 
The interviewee explain that they also aim at improve "the quality of judicial decisions 
and the judges' competence.” More broadly, he explains that the goal is to reinforce the 
institutional capacity and strengthen the authority of public authorities. Lastly, he 
mentions, “the purpose of some QIPs is to improve the living conditions of the 
population."114 Indeed, the policy requires that the projects be "rapidly-implementable 
and of benefit to the population."115 The QIPs projects proposals come from ministries, 
local authorities or directly from the community, therefore, depending on which entity 
initiates it, the purpose might change to respond a need from the demanding stakeholder. 
It is also noted that the timeframe will differ, for instance, the use of QIPs for the public 
authority, such as the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, seems to be based on a 
longer-term goal (strengthening the rule of law), although using small projects. When it 
comes directly from a need of the community the project is on a short-term basis, such as 
installing solar panels or building a community plaza.  
The interviewee at the UNHQ reinforces that statement by saying that the QIPs 
primary purpose is to build confidence in the Mission and the peace process “[...] because 
                                                        
112 Ibid. p 6 
113 MINUSTAH: Evaluation of MINUSTAH Quick Impact Projects, July 2012. p14 
114 Interview in French, Ibid, p6. 
115 Ibid, Policy, 12 February 2007.  
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we want those actors to be engaged and supportive of the peace process, so QIPs are one 
of the tools to develop this kind of relationship."116 As an example, the MINUSTAH 
mission in partnership with the Ministry of Justice and Public Security set up a large 
construction process of facilities for tribunals. Thanks to the QIPs project of construction, 
the Ministry became owner of more than 70% of the tribunal facilities compared to only 
10% in the past.  
QIPs are also used to develop strong relationships between the Mission and the 
government, local authorities, civil society representatives and the population. Not only 
does each project respond to a specific need, it also would be impossible for the different 
partners to answer these needs without funds from the Mission. As an example the 
MINUSTAH officer explained that the tribunal of Saint Michel de l'Attalaye is the result 
of a partnership between MINUSTAH, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, local 
authorities and civil society, and the Haitian President described it as a “very beautiful 
structure”. However, in some cases, when the UN Mission has not enough funds, 
development agencies such as UNDP can participate in the project. These projects are 
really directed toward the increase of the well-being of the population. 
QIPs in Haiti are also aimed at facilitating dialogue and understanding between 
the mission, civil society and the Haitian State. The human rights, justice, electoral 
divisions and the component to decrease community violence inside MINUSTAH 
focused their QIPs on this process of improving the dialogue and the relations between 
society groups, either public or private. These projects enable MINUSTAH to develop 
strong relations with most components of the Haitian society and therefore strengthen its 
                                                        
116 Interview with a Civil Affairs Officer at the UN Secretariat, August 13th, 2014. p3 
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legitimacy in working for the development of rule of law and peace. As the interviewee 
stated, "the execution of QIPs allow a direct contact with the local authorities and with 
several civil society grassroots associations and with the population. It appears as the 
Mission satisfies a communal claim, therefore facilitating dialogue and comprehension 
between stakeholders."117 
The QIPs have helped the security organs (Haitian National Police) to strengthen 
their authority in a democratic manner, reinforcing de facto the country peace 
stabilization process. The corrections team of MINUSTAH also developed many projects 
in order to humanize the corrections facilities. The improvement of the living conditions 
for inmates can strengthen security by diminishing the risk of escape and enhance the 
chances of rehabilitation. QIPs also assisted the corrections facilities in training on 
gender and human rights in corrections facilities. Indeed, stabilizing a country is also 
ensuring the development of a strong normative system in the public spheres in order to 
avoid riots and violence. Security has also been enhanced through the establishment of 
QIPs in difficult neighborhoods where the dialogue with the public authority has long 
been inexistent. As stated by the interview, the objective was also to show that the 
mission is not only focusing on military work but it is also willing to reach security 
through development projects.118  
QIPs influence the visibility of the mission’s work, which does not only involve 
military peacekeeping. Indeed, "even if people can easily forget the catastrophic security 
situation of the past, they are witnessing the material achievements that have improved 
the living conditions in their community such as construction or school refurbishing, 
                                                        
117 Interview in French, Ibid, p.4  
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construction of police stations, corrections facilities, drinkable water access in remote and 
poor neighborhood of the Haitian territory that has often been forgotten by the public 
authorities in the past."119 
Thanks to these projects, the reputation of the mission has tremendously 
improved. Projects are a reflection of the community's demand and operated with 
transparency with the participation of civil society in order to establish, as it is expected, 
a climate of harmony and trust between the population and the mission.120 Furthermore, 
after the Cholera crisis, an anti-MINUSTAH resentment started to grow. The Parliament 
even considered agreeing to the full departure of MINUSTAH. However, the QIPs have 
been able to reintroduce the population to the work of the Mission, its positive influence 
and in some ways were able to prevent its departure. With good communication and 
some projects focusing on the improvement of the living conditions of the population, 
MINUSTAH has legitimize its role within the stabilization of Haiti. 
QIPs seemed to be a useful tool for the MINUSTAH Mission in order to develop 
partnerships and open dialogues with society stakeholders. It also seems to assist in 
strengthening the rule of law and education in faraway areas. It helps the Mission to work 
with the Haitian State to reinforce its democratic authority and stabilize the country.  
A few shortcomings were mentioned during the interviews: Firstly a problem may 
emerge if too much attention is given to assist the government in strengthening its 
capacity. On the long-term, the population may benefit from it but not necessarily in the 
short timeframe that is given to implement QIPs. Therefore the original purpose of QIPs 
to build confidence between the mission and the population, in a rapid manner, may be 
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jeopardized. Secondly, certain projects might overlap with the work of development 
agencies and creates tensions in the work environment. In order to avoid such overlaps, 
dialogue should be developed between all work partners but at the risk of extending the 
process of implementation. Lastly, the implementation cycle is designed with "too many 
steps."121 As it was previously explained, the implementation cycle requires phases of 
approbations, reports writing, a sinuous bureaucratic process, vacations and lateness of 
the implementing partners. All of these delay the finish date of a project to a point where 
it can take up to a year and a half when the policy sets the deadline to 6 months. 
Moreover, because most of components implementing QIPs do not have a direct budget, 
there is a long period of waiting to get the approval of the Project Review Committee, the 
Regional Civil Affairs team or the Division Mission Support.  
The last part comprehends experiences from the MINUSTAH team manager 
which reveal the complications that might erupt during the process of implementing 
QIPs. With experiences taken from other missions, this analysis will be able to draw 
conclusions on the impact that QIPs might have on a mission's work.  
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Chapter VIII. General discussion 
Unfortunately, as mentioned before, it was quite difficult to reach people for 
interviews due to the distance and because UN staff members are extremely busy.  I was 
grateful, however, for their participation in adding first-hand information on these QIPs 
projects 
Besides the difficulty in gathering data, this section of the thesis establishes a 
framework for evaluation in order to assess the impact of QIPs on the mission’s 
effectiveness. More precisely, I will attempt to develop an assessment plan to understand 
whether QIPs really contribute to confidence-building and therefore assist in the 
achievement of the mission’s purpose.  Indeed, effectiveness will be described as the 
capacity to achieve the mandated tasks. 
According to the civil affairs officer at the UN headquarters, “QIPs are a tool, 
essential in accompanying the mission’s life span and most of its existence.” 122  Its 
primary purpose is to build confidence and “to maintain a proactive communications and 
public outreach strategy to improve public understanding of the mandate and the role of 
MINUSTAH in Haiti”123 as it is required in the resolution 1743 regarding MINUSTAH. 
This section first examines the necessary refocusing that all missions should 
undertake, followed by the development of observations to assist the missions in 
developing a survey that they would use in order to assess the population’s trust 
development since the introduction of QIPs. 
 
 
                                                        
122 Interview with a Civil affairs officer, p4 
123 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1743, S/RES/1743 (2007), p.4 
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Extending the actors and their role 
In none of the answers did the interviewees clearly detail the role of the actors. 
Many were listed, from government agencies, grassroots NGOs to UN entities, although 
the bond created by their work on the projects were never explicitly explained. In 
MINUSTAH for instance the main actors seem to be the UN, and the national and local 
authorities, although not much were said on NGOs nor did the participant explain who 
the implementing partners were. What is striking is also the absence of clarity regarding 
the relations between the national and local authorities to the population. It is obvious 
that the QIPs are supposed to create a climate of trust between the mission and the 
population, but not much is said about the creation of a bond between the mission and 
other partners however this would be essential to assess if one’s was willing to estimate 
the impact of QIPs on the Mission’s effectiveness. Trying to simply evaluate the impact 
of QIPs on the increase of the population’s trust seems to reduce the influence of QIPs to 
only one angle of the prism. I do believe that the survey should be detailed in as much 
categories as they are relevant partners. It would enable the evaluation to gather the 
opinions of all the actors involved.  
Another important remark is regarding the lack of comments on the creation of a 
bond between the local authorities and the population. Indeed, if QIPs are supposed to 
increase the well-being of the population and assist the mission in its tasks, then 
supporting the creation of a strong bond between the population and the public authorities 
seems to be essential. Stabilization and capacity building can only be properly 
implemented if the population starts to trust its political representatives. The mission 
should therefore work on this level and QIPs could be an important bridge to connect 
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these two actors. The population would develop its trust; the government would nurture 
it. Thinking the process at a micro-level such as with QIPs could be an appropriate start 
to further enhance the state building capacity. Indeed, it could also help the mission in 
connecting the short-term projects to the long-term mandated tasks. Again, in order to 
undertake such process, a survey should be developed to acknowledge the relational 
problems that the population might have regarding its political representatives. Many post 
conflict country experience corruption, political violence, and a significant problem of 
trust. Hence QIPs should be redefining its purpose to include the development of a 
climate of trust between all the actors involved in order to notice a tangible change in the 
confidence-building process.  
The pivotal part in QIPs is the population. Yet, one of the problems that came out 
during the interviews is the difficulty to understand what the people need. In order for the 
QIPs to have a proper impact this question should be made a priority in order for the 
QIPs to be effective and consequently enhance the creation of trust whether between the 
community and the mission or as previously mentioned, between the population and its 
political representatives. The QIPs need to be centered on the idea of “need of the 
population”. Because the timescale of the project only starts when the first payment has 
been made to the implementing partner, a time of research and opinion survey should be 
exercised in order to grasp what is the definition of these needs. Indeed, the civil affairs 
officer mentioned this question during his interview and said: “how do you identify the 
need of the population?”124 This is an extremely relevant question to understand the 
impact of QIPs on the mission’s effectiveness. If the population trust is the center of the 
                                                        
124 Ibid, p8 
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QIPs purpose, and to some extent, the center of the mission’s itself as it is trying to 
stabilize a country and build long-lasting peace, the impact cannot be assessed if the need 
of the main target is not defined. Thus, the main problem is for the missions to have been 
able to assess efficiency but never effectiveness. The leadership of the mission will define 
the priorities to which QIPs will have to keep pace with. However, in all the interviews, 
nobody mentioned the need of the population or its participation in defining these 
priorities that the QIPs will need to be based on.  
The survey 
The confidence-building system that creates bridges between actors via QIPs 
misses the step to define the population needs. Currently, the need of the population 
might be a priority in the establishment of QIPs but is not yet considered as a centerpiece 
in the QIPs system. It means that the missions lack the capacity to assess QIPs impact on 
their effectiveness due to a shortcoming of understanding of what could really be 
beneficial to the population. By working with all the actors of the society, public and 
private, along with a participation of the different UN agencies, the missions could 
achieve synergy to reach not only efficiency, but an effective application of QIPs, which 
on a longer term could positively impact the mission. 
Below is a chart representing how the cycle of trust should be defined:  
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The chart of an effective confidence-building system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The priorities of the missions are often defined on rational basis. For instance, the 
definition in MONUSCO of islands of stabilities was made in order to focus the work in 
the violence abatement, as it was defined by Diehl’s and Druckman. However, if the 
general goals are important, they are not sufficient to establish trust. Trust is based on a 
more emotional connection between the trusted and the trustee. If confidence-building 
should be developed, a survey of the community members should be made, in accordance 
with local authorities and chiefs, to learn how they define the priorities. 
The survey should therefore be done, before and after the implementation of QIPs and 
should attempt to gather the opinions of the surveyed people. After gathering the 
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information enabling the establishment of proposals, the political representatives and 
chiefs would assist the missions in selecting the more significant one. This step would 
create partnerships and trust between the mission and the population but also create a link 
between the represented and their authorities. After a selection of proposed projects, the 
mission would start the implementation cycle. At the closure of projects, a new survey 
should be made to realize the evolution of trust.  
Volunteers should do the survey, in order not to lose any part of the QIPs budget. 
Local universities, politically engaged people or even foreigners might be willing to 
assist the mission in creating a stable bond between all the stakeholders.  By doing so, the 
volunteers would help the mission in defining what the population wants, and by 
precisely answering these needs with the assistance of other actors, they would create a 
long-lasting bond, as it is expected; the link of trust would circulate and develop a 
positive and stable environment in which the missions could advance long-term projects.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
As it was stated in the beginning of this analysis, QIPs are expected to assist the 
mission in achieving its mandate by developing strong relations with the population. 
However, the bureaucratic system in which the UN personnel is held gives difficulty to 
adequately assess its impact. The QIPs efficiency is defined in the all the documents that 
the missions use to establish QIPs. However, the United Nations struggles to assess its 
effectiveness, that is to say the impact that it has in building a confidence system between 
all the stakeholders. The civil officers who was interviewed at the UN headquarters in 
New York perfectly summed up this dilemma between efficiency and effectiveness:  
“I think the main problem of QIPs is we have not developed a capacity or 
an ability to assess their impacts. So I mean the reports I shared with you 
basically was trying to look at the efficiency of QIPs. Because I think 
member states have been coming back and forth on why QIPs was often 
implemented beyond the given timeline, they’re really focusing on process 
and so that’s why we attempt to look at who is responsible, what is the 
average value of project, … But actually nobody is really asking, how do 
we measure whether their contributing to the confidence”125 
He states an important dynamic that is recurrent in UN works, what is expected 
by the mission from the state members and what the mission should be doing in order to 
achieve a high level of effectiveness. Another interviewee from MINUSMA who 
previously worked at MINUSTAH approached the same issue when he discussed the 
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evaluation made by the auditors, which are usually representing the state members even 
though they are working as a board of auditors for the United Nations. He thus explains:  
“Because this is also true, and this is an interesting part, when we 
receive the auditors from the UN, which are auditors from member 
countries, they work as board of auditors for the UN but they are from 
the member countries, typically their understanding is the typical of the 
financial output, so they don’t have, most of the case, experience from 
the field and 90% of the case they just stay at the capital so they don’t 
have any idea of how things are in the field and they tend to just apply 
the regulations as it is from NYC so this also is a bit discouraging 
because if the control that comes from NY are really rigid, I don’t think 
any chief of administration is ready to get criticized from on the 
outdoors or works and be ready to apply more flexible processes.”126 
Both agree that the difficulty to adequately assess the impact of QIPs is because 
too much importance is given to their efficiency, to the “process” that the former one 
consider “rigid”.  
For the missions to be able to satisfactorily assess the impact of QIPs on the 
confidence building, which would have a consequent impact on the effectiveness of the 
mission, flexibility should be introduced in their implementation process, to encompass 
the evaluation of the needs of the population. Including local or foreign volunteers to 
establish survey, including researchers and students from the academic world in order to 
delegate this evaluation process would assure the proper assessment of the population 
                                                        
126 Interview with a UN staff at MINUSMA, February 2015, p7-8 
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needs. Discussion with the community should also assist the mission in creating 
confidence while giving them the ability to adequately reply to the population’s requests.  
However, as the person at MONUSCO explained, she was only going to the field a few 
times a year. 
Moreover, the missions should also not forget in their assessment the confidence 
created between them and other partners and between these partners and the community. 
Impact can only be properly assessed if all angles of the confidence-building system are 
being analyzed. Also, improvement regarding effectiveness can only be achieved if the 
missions acknowledge all the particularities of this system.  
The main priority is to encompass the community as the main stakeholder. 
Efficiency is worthy, however, the missions will never be effective if confidence is not at 
the foundation of its work.  
I regret that this analysis did not obtain more data to further define what could be 
undertaken by the missions, however it raised the importance of putting the community 
back at the center of the QIPs process, and raised the necessity for QIPs to not only build 
confidence between the missions and the populations, but simply to create a circle of 
common understanding and trust which would then become a real stepping stone for the 
missions to achieve its mandate and develop a strong, stable, “healthy” society.  
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